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NONTAXPAYER SUITS: SEEKING INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST IRS
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
JOHN

A.

LYNCH*

INTRODUCTION

D

1976 Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee hearing on
the causes of popular discontent with the administration of justice,
noted tax policy activist Thomas F. Field testified:
Bureaucrats, whether in the Internal Revenue Service or elsewhere, can
make honest mistakes. Moreover, they can yield to political and other
pressures to engage in lawless or illegal administrative actions.
That is why, more than a generation ago, Congress provided broad
access to the courts for those wishing to obtain judicial review of agency
action.
But in the case of the Internal Revenue Service, judicial review [of]
some of the most important agency actions is claimed by the IRS to be
barred by statute, judicial precedent or a combination of both. And,
to date, those IRS claims have been generally sustained by the courts.
The IRS actions which are said to be beyond the scrutiny of the
courts fall into two categories: tax giveaways, and actions which injure
the rights of non-taxpayers.'
Who should be entitled to challenge Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
tax policy decision making? Should the concerned citizen or the aggrieved
competitor of a company receiving favorable treatment from the IRS be
precluded from seeking review of allegedly illegal action when his own taxes
are not specifically involved?
URING A

In posing such questions, it is necessary to emphasize at the outset that
there is ample statutory and judicial support for Mr. Field's contention that
the IRS has been given an unprecedented, and uncalled for, immunity from
challenge to its actions in the federal courts.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; J.D., LL.M., George Washington
University.
'Hearings on the Discontent with the Administration of Justice Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Jud. Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (May 19,
1976).
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Recognizing that tax revenues are the life blood of government, Con-

gress long ago sharply restricted the avenues available to taxpayers for judicial challenge to the assessment or collection of taxes. Enactment of the
Tax Anti-Injunction Act2 and a statute removing tax cases from the purview
of the Declaratory Judgment Act' has limited the taxpayer whose own taxes

are aL issue, or whose property is to be subjected to IRS tax collection
methods.' The taxpayer must now challenge assessment and collection of
the tax either before payment in a proceeding in the United States Tax Court8

or after payment of the disputed tax in a suit for refund.' The Supreme
Court promptly upheld the constitutionality of delaying a taxpayer's challenge to the collection of a tax until after his property had been taken.'
Congress has created some exceptions to the nearly complete ban against

judicial proceedings which would interfere with the IRS assessment and
collection process. Such exceptions include special judicial review of the tax

exempt status of organizations, 8 jeopardy assessments, 9 and claims of wrongful levies on property owned by an individual or entity whose property is

seized on account of the taxes of another individual or entity.1" The first two
of these exceptions were enacted as a result of Supreme Court decisions11

'Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475 (now I.R.C. § 7421(a)). Te statute now
reads: "except as provided insections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b)(1),
and 7429(b) no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person isthe person against
whom such tax was assessed."
$28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
In a case of actual controversy within itsjurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
Taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relation of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief isor could be sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such (emphasis added).
The portion of the above provision pertaining to federal taxes was added by the Revenue
Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 405, 49 Stat. 1027.
,'The assessment provisions of the Internal Revenue Code comprise ch. 63 of the Code,
I.R.C. §§ 6201-16. The collection provisions appear inch. 64 of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 6301-65.
Special jeopardy assessment provisions appear in ch. 70 of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 68516873.
5I.R.C. § 7451-64.
6 I.R.C. § 7422.
'Dodge v.Osborne, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916).
8 I.R.C. § 7428 (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306, 90
Stat. 1717).
9 I.R.C. § 7429 (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.94-455, § 1204, 90
Stat. 1695).
10 .R.C. § 7426.
11 I.R.C. § 7428, which permits a tax exempt organization qualifying under I.R.C. § 501(c)
(3), to seek a declaratory judgment inthe Tax Court or the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia with respect to itsinitial or continuing qualification as a tax
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and the third codified a doctrine developed in the federal courts that pro-

tected third parties whose property was levied upon by the IRS."2 The Supreme Court has fashioned its own very limited exception to the AntiInjunction Act,1" but it is rarely used successfully. " For the most part,
however, taxpayers must litigate issues concerning federal tax liability in the

Tax Court or in a refund suit. This was the intent of Congress in enacting
the Anti-Injunction Act and in establishing a procedure for judicial chal-

lenge to taxes only after payment and appeal to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.' 5
It is clear that Congress' system of "tax justice" does not, in itself, pro-

vide an adequate judicial forum, or even any forum, for many controversies
involving the interpretation or administration of the Internal Revenue Code.
This is because the IRS, in exercising its power to make rules and regulations
exempt organization, arose out of the following language in a decision of the Supreme
Court:
In holding that § 7421(a) blocks the present suit, we are not unaware that Congress
has imposed an especially harsh regime on § 501(c)(3) organizations threatened with
loss of tax-exempt status and with withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility of
contributions .

. .

. Specific treatment of not-for-profit organizations to allow them to

seek pre-enforcement review may well merit consideration. But this matter is for
Congress ....

Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1974). See H.R. REP. No. 658,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 283 (1975). I.R.C. §§ 6851 and 6861 were enacted as a result of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976). See S.
REP. No. 938, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 363-64 (1976).
2

See
$
Rothensies v. Ullman, 110 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940); Bullock v. Latham, 306 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1962); Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (D. Mont. 1922).
1
31n Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962), the Court
held that assessment and collection of tax may be enjoined only "if it is . . . apparent that,
under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish
its claim . . ." and equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. See also Pietsch v. President, 434
F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971).
But cf. Trinity United Methodist Church v. United States, 35 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-588
(N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 1975) (where the court granted a preliminary injunction against an
excise tax upon a showing by the plaintiff that "its claim is not frivolous and that the
government would not be able to establish any reason why the relief sought by the plaintiff should not be granted").
For a thorough discussion of the Williams Packing decision see Note, 1963 DuKE L.J.
1975 (1963).
14In Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973), the
plaintiff, a § 501(c)(3) organization whose status was revoked under circumstances indicating a great amount of political pressure, was successful in obtaining an injunction against
denial by the IRS of its § 501(c)(3) status. This was on the basis of a finding by the
court that, inter alia:
the Plaintiff was denied a favorable ruling because it was singled out for selective treatment for political ideological and other improper reasons which have no basis in the
statute and regulations . . . [and that] other factors indicate that the Defendants did
not have "clean hands" in their dealings with the Plaintiff.
368 F. Supp. at 880.
25 Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193 (1883).
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in administering the tax laws, may raise significant issues of social or economic policy."6 An IRS determination, whether adversely affecting the tax

liability of a single taxpayer or not, may have significant economic consequences for many persons and interests. This was recognized by a former
IRS Chief Counsel:
Although the rulings program directly affects only a comparatively

small percentage of taxpayers, it has a broad impact on our national
economy and on proper and reasonable tax administration. Just as the

tax specialist has become a way of life so has the tax ruling.... Businesses have been destroyed by failure to receive a favorable ruling."
From time to time the action of the IRS may, by chance or design, appear to have social consequences unrelated to the raising of revenue." There
have been instances in which IRS action, regardless of real or purported
tax administration consequences, may have been seen as tending to foster

national social objectives such as racial integration
stifle

9

or as an attempt to

dissent.2"

Although it is likely that Congress' sole purpose in providing for such
a controlled procedure of judicial review of IRS action was to protect the
'I.R.C. § 7805(a). E.g., Common Cause v. Connally, No. CA 1337-71 (D.D.C., voluntarily dismissed on motion of plaintiff, Jan. 13, 1972) in which various plaintiffs sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Treasury Department's implementation of the
Asset Depreciation Range System (ADR) of depreciation under I.R.C. § 167, 26 C.F.R.
1.167 (a)-11 (1971). Common Cause, a national citizens' organization, alleged that the
billions of dollars that would allegedly be lost to the treasury would be unavailable to finance programs espoused by its members. Plaintiff Rep. Henry Reuss, a Congressman, alleged
that the adoption of ADR without congressional authorization undermined the significance
of his vote. The suit was mooted by Congress' adoption of ADR in the Revenue Act of
1971.
17 Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756,
764 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
1s Referring to the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning § 501(c)(3)
organizations as "tantamount to a licensing procedure," Justice Blackmun, dissenting in
Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974), complained:
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very well
so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social policy the Commissioner
happens to be advocating at the time (a social policy the merits of which I make no
attempt to evaluate), but the application of our tax laws would not operate in so
fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in the first instance is a matter for legislative
concern. To the extent these determinations are reposed in the authority of the Internal
Revenue Service, they should have the system of checks and balances before an organization that for years has been favored with an exemption ruling is imperiled by an
allegedly unconstitutional direction on the part of the Service.
416 U.S. at 774-75. Congress has since acted to provide judicial review for tax-exempt
organizations. See supra note 11.
'19E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
20 E.g., Center for Corporate Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss1/6
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ability of the government to raise needed revenue, 1 judicial review is almost
always limited for the taxpayer whose own taxes are at issue. This is true
even when IRS action with respect to such a taxpayer appears to have motivation other than tax administration and when judicial intervention in such
IRS action would have a marginal or collateral effect on revenues. If an
action by anyone threatens interference in any way with real or potential
tax assessment or collection or would result in the diminution of actual or
potential tax liability of any taxpayer, then such action will run afoul of the
proscriptions of I.R.C. Section 7421(a) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2201.
This has been clearly established by three decisions of the Supreme
Court.22 In Bob Jones University v. Simon," the plaintiff was a racially segregated private university which attempted to obtain injunctive relief against
IRS withdrawal of its status as a Section 501 (c) (3) organization. 2 ' The
plaintiff asserted that it was not seeking to enjoin collection of tax but
rather to restrain the withdrawal of its qualification as a Section 501 (c) (3)
organization. 25 Although the Court noted that it was open to debate whether
or not the plaintiff would owe federal income taxes upon revocation of its
Section 501 (c) (3) status, they held that Section 7421 (a) barred such a
suit because withdrawal of the status would result in FICA and FUTA2 6 tax
liability on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, any injunction of the IRS action
would be an injunction of taxes. 7 With regard to the plaintiff's contention
that the IRS action did not truly involve taxes, the Court held:
There is no evidence that [this] position, [the inapplicability of Section
501 (c) (3) to racially segregated universities,] does not represent a good
faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the tax laws, and
. ..we cannot say that its position has no basis or is unrelated to the
protection of the revenues.2
The Court also noted that by attempting to assure the deductible character of donations to it, the plaintiff sought "to restrain the collection of
taxes from its donors-to force the Service to continue to provide advance
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1875).
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U.S. 752 (1974); United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974).
23 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
24
Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) certain "clorporations, and any community chest, fund or
foundation, organized and operated for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary or artistic purposes" etc. are exempt from taxation. I.R.C. §§ 170 (a) & (c)
permit donors to such organizations deductions from gross income.
25 416 U.S. at 725.
- I.R.C. §§ 3501-05.
27 416 U.S. at 739.
28
1d.at 740.
21
2
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assurance to those donors that contributions to petitioner will be recognized
as tax deductible, thereby reducing their tax liability."2
In Bob Jones University, the plaintiff's contention that the matter was
not a tax controversy was somewhat ambivalent. The Court noted that the
university had alleged in the district court that its tax liability might be "three.
quarters of a million dollars for one year and in excess of half a million
dollars for another."3 In view of that contention, it would be difficult to
argue that the connection between the plaintiff's suit and the assessment and
collection of taxes was attenuated.
In "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters,31 the interference with federal
revenues threatened by the plaintiff's action was questionable. In "Americans
United" Inc., a nonprofit educational corporation dedicated to disseminating
knowledge concerning the constitutional principle of church and state, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against an IRS letter ruling revoking its
Section 501(c) (3) status. In revoking the plaintiff's status the IRS contended that the plaintiff had devoted a substantial part of its activities to
attempts to influence legislation and had thereby lost its requisite status.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the action". However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.3 Although the organization had voluntarily paid its FUTA tax liability occasioned by revocation of its Section 501 (c) (3) status, " the Court
noted that "the obvious goal of respondent's action was to restore advance
assurance that donations to it would qualify as charitable deductions under
Section 170 that would reduce the level of taxes of its donors."3 5 The Court
held that "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyone's taxes
triggers the literal terms of § 7421.""
Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's holding. His opinion did
w
not disapprove of the Williams Packing and Navigation Co. construction
29 Id. at 739.

s0 ld. at 738.
31416 U.S. 752 (1974).
82 "Americans United" Inc. v. Waiters, 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court of
appeals dismissed the suit as to individual benefactors who were coplaintiffs with "Americans United" because their taxes were directly affected. The court of appeals, in holding
the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act exception inapplicable held that
"Americans United" did not seek to enjoin its own taxes, that it had volunteered to pay
any FUTA taxes even if its status were restored and that the restraining of collection or
assessment of taxes was "at best a collateral effect" of the organization's suit. Id. at 1177-79.
83 416 U.S. 752.
34 Id. at 755 n.4.
as ld. at 760-61.
86 Id. at 760.
37 Id. at 762 n.13.
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limiting actions for injunctive relief in tax cases but regarded that case as
factually distinguishable because the "incidence of taxation" was challenged
therein. 8 In "Americans United" Inc., however, the "avowed purpose" of
the organization's lawsuit was "not to restrain tax collection but to assure
"Americans United" restoration to the Cumulative List [of 501 (c) (3)] organizations."'3 Justice Blackmun added:
Arguably, where the challenged governmental action is not one intended to produce revenue but, rather, is one to accomplish a broadbased policy objective through the medium of federal taxation, the
application of § 7421 (a) is inappropriate. Obviously, § 501 (c) (3) is
not designed to raise money. Its purpose, rather, is to assure the existence of truly philanthropic organizations and the continuation of the
important public benefits they bestow. 0
Justice Blackmun concluded as a result of the Court's broad construction of
Section 7421 (a) and their decision in Williams Packing and Navigation Co.
that "§ 7421 becomes an absolute bar to any and all injunctions, irrespective of tax liability, of purpose or effect of the suit, or of the character of
the Service's action.""
The subsequent per curiam opinion of the Court in United States v.
American Friends Service Committee,"2 also demonstrates the broad scope
of Section 7421(a). In that case the plaintiff was a religious corporation.
Two of the corporation's employees who were conscientious objectors to war
asked their employer not to withhold 51.6% of what was required to be
withheld under Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, alleging this to
be the percentage of the federal budget related to military spending. " The
employer complied with the employee's request but paid to the government the
full amount that should have been withheld. The employer sued for a refund
of the amounts paid to the government but not withheld from the employees'
wages. The IRS had also levied on the employees and thus had received a
double payment of 51.6% of the employees' taxes. The employees joined in
the employer's action seeking an injunction against enforcement of the tax
against the employer." The district court granted an injunction prohibiting
38

Id. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

39 Id.

0old. at 771-72.
42 Id. at 771.
42419

U.S. 7 (1974).

43Id. at 7 n.1.

4"The employees did not dispute their tax liability. However, they contended that the enforced withholding of their wages "was unconstitutional as a deprivation of their right to free

exercise of religion under the First Amendment since it did not allow them to bear witness
to their beliefs by refusing to voluntarily pay a portion of their taxes." Id. at 8.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979
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the United States from enforcing Section 3402 against the employer as to
51.6% of the employees' wages. "5 The district court granted the employer
judgment for the amount of the double payment which the United States
did not contest on appeal."
The employees contended that because only one method of collection
had been enjoined, the Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable. The Court
held that this contention "ignores the plain wording of the Act which proscribes 'any suit for restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.' ""
The employees then argued that a refund suit was an inadequate remedy for
them because they would surely lose such an action. Citing Bob Jones University and "Americans United" Inc., the Court noted that the employees
would nevertheless have a full opportunity to litigate their tax liability in
such a suit" and that the constitutional nature of the employees' claim did
not render the bar of Section 7421 (a) inapplicable."
Although the injunctive relief granted by the district court was in a
proceeding joined with a suit for refund, the court concluded that "[tihe
injunctive relief granted by the District Court in this case is plainly at odds
with the dual objectives of the Act: efficient and expeditious collection of
taxes with 'a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference,' and protection of the collector from litigation pending a refund suit."" a
Thus, Bob Jones University, "Americans United" Inc. and American
Friends Service Committee make it clear that the Anti-Injunction Act, except in cases where the Williams Packing and Navigation Co. exception is
applicable, bars actions for injunctive relief in the following instances:
1. Where a taxpayer's own tax liability is conceivably at issue, whether
or not any taxes are currently due;
2. Where there is a possibility that such action may lead to a reduction
of the taxes of another;
3. Where there may be any interference with the tax assessment or
collection process.
From a tax administration standpoint, these three propositions are
sound. A forum is provided for the taxpayer who may incur tax liability
368 F. Supp. 1176, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
419 U.S. at 9.
47 Id. at 10.
45

46

48Id.

'9Id. at 11-12. In his dissent Justice Douglas points out that the application of § 7421(a)
to deny a taxpayer the right to contest federal taxes for religious reasons is a violation of
that person's constitutional rights. Id. at 16.
5o ld. at 12.
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so that he is able to contest the validity of his liability. In many instances,
if the taxpayer so desires, he may avail himself of this opportunity before
paying the tax.51 As noted above, Congress has dealt with some of the more
aggravated instances of irreparable injury that may be caused by delaying
taxpayer access to a judicial forum outside of the Tax Court or in a refund
suit. "
Furthermore, it is prudent not to permit an organization or other entity
to litigate issues that may result in diminution of tax liability of third parties.
Careful selection of plaintiffs could result in sidestepping congressional intent
to relegate those whose tax liability is directly at issue to Tax Court or refund suit remedies.
However, a question to which no clear answer has yet emerged is
whether the IRS may be enjoined at the behest of plaintiffs whose tax liability is not at issue, who do not seek to lessen anyone's tax burden or to interfere with tax assessment or collection in any way, but who allege that they have
been injured or aggrieved in some way by IRS action. The answer to this
question depends upon whether the overriding purpose of Congress in relegating taxpayers to a position where they have access only to narrow channels of judicial review was solely to protect tax revenues from undue interference or whether it was also to grant the tax collecting agency a unique
trusteeship over its domain, with a minimum of "lay" judicial interference.
If an action does not threaten the revenues themselves, but instead seeks to
air tax policy grievances, it should not lie if Congress has determined that the
IRS is to fashion tax policy without judicial interference. If, however, Congress has provided judicial review of IRS practices so that there can be
examination and input by the general public as to tax policy, the action
should be allowed to proceed. It is contended herein that actions for injunc51 8 P-H 1978 FED. TAXES 1 38,936. The remedy in the Tax Court is generally limited to
cases where the Commissioner has determined a deficiency in income, estate or gift taxes
and excise taxes imposed on foundations by I.R.C. §§ 4941-45, or when a fiduciary or
transferee has received a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court also has jurisdiction over
declaratory judgments related to retirement plans, I.R.C. § 7476, and has concurrent jurisdiction over declaratory judgments involving tax-exempt organizations. The Tax Court lacks
equitable jurisdiction. See Hays Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 426, aff'd, 331 F.2d
422 (7th Cir. 1964).
2 See supra note 11. A refund suit is no guarantee that the issues the taxpayer seeks to
contest will be litigated. A problem noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in "Americans
United" Inc., is that when small amounts of money are involved in a refund suit, the government can avoid litigation of the issues raised by the taxpayer by tendering a refund. See
Mitchell v. Riddell, 402 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 394
U.S. 456 (1969); Church of Scientology v. United States, 485 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1973).
Whether a court could resolve the issues the taxpayer seeks to litigate in the taxpayer's favor
in futuro through injunctive relief against the service to avoid the necessity of multiple
refund suits has not been resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. 416 U.S. at 748 n.22;
419 U.S. at 11.
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tive and declaratory relief are permissible against IRS action when, if strin-

gent standing requirements are met, the plaintiff has no other means of obtaining judicial review and the action will not result in a decrease in federal
revenues.
I. SIMON V. EASTERN KENTUCKY WELFARR RTGHTS
ORGANIZATION: STANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR NONTAXPAYERS

An opportunity to resolve the question of whether actions for injunctive
or declaratory relief which do not threaten interference with tax assessment
or collection are ever permissible against the IRS was presented in Simon v.
5" The Court did not answer
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.

the question in its majority opinion. 5" This case involved a suit by several
indigent individuals and organizations composed of indigents for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Com-

missioner of Internal Revenue. The plaintiffs attacked a determination by the
IRS granting Section 501(c) (3) "charitable" status to nonprofit hospitals
which provide only free emergency room care, as opposed to inpatient care,
to persons unable to pay."5 The challenged Revenue Ruling did not explicitly involve a hospital at which any of the plaintiffs had attempted to receive medical care. Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were disadvantaged
in seeking hospital services because of indigency. The complaint alleged that
each hospital which denied free medical care to one of the plaintiffs "had
been determined by the Secretary and the Commissioner to be a tax-exempt
charitable corporation, and each received substantial private contributions."5

No hospital was a defendant in the suit. The plaintiffs contended that the
challenged ruling departed from the proper interpretation of the term "chari53426 U.S. 26 (1976).
54

Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion did provide an answer to some degree by commenting:
I join the opinion of the Court holding that the plaintiff in this case did not have
standing to sue, I add only that I cannot imagine a case, at least outside the First
Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could
have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else.
Id. at 46. For a recent note discussing the decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, see
Note, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 728 (1977). It was concluded by the author therein that "[tlhe
Simon holding appears to have effectively foreclosed the bringing of public interest challenges
to government action under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act before the
present Court." id. at 738. Standing requirements for plaintiffs seeking IRS action shall be
discussed in part III herein.
55 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 117, modifying Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. Btum.
202 which read in part:
It [a hospital seeking treatment as a charitable organization] must not refuse to accept
patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for such services. Furthermore if it
operates with the expectation of full payment from all those whom it renders services,
it does not render charity merely because some of its patients fail to pay for the services
rendered.
Id. at 203.
56 426 U.S. at 33.
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table" in the Internal Revenue Code as established by the "legislative history
of the Code, regulations of the IRS and judicial precedent."5 '
In the district court the defendants made a motion to dismiss based
upon the plaintiffs' standing, the nonjusticiability of the subject matter, the
Anti-Injunction Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.5" The district court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs but the court of appeals for the District of Columbia circuit reversed. 9 Although the court of appeals upheld the challenged regulations
on the merits, it rejected the defendants' contention that the district court
lacked jurisdiction." ° Both parties petitioned for certiorari and both petitions
were granted by the Supreme Court and consolidated into one case."l
The Supreme Court held that the suit should have been dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing:
We do not reach either the question of whether a third party ever may
challenge IRS treatment of another, or the question of whether there
is a statutory or immunity bar to this suit. We conclude that the District
Court should have granted petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground
that respondents' complaint failed to establish their standing to sue."2
In holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the issuance
of Revenue Ruling 69-545, the Court noted that standing is a limitation on
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction that "focuses on the party seeking
to get his complaint before a federal court on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated."'" In order to determine whether a plaintiff is a proper party
for purposes of the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement of federal court jurisdiction," inquiry must focus on "whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely
57

Id.

581d. at 34-35.
59 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6
0 The court held that:
mhe pertinent Congressional enactments indicate a Congressional intent that the
actions of the Internal Revenue Service be subject to judicial review . . . . By means
of refund and deficiency actions, the courts review the policies, practices, rulings, and
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Service . . . . As noted, supra, the rationale
limiting suits to the post-collection period is not applicable in this case. To limit plaintiffs to a refund action under these facts is, as the district court concluded, equivalent
to denying them judicial relief. That result is without foundation in the revelvant law.
id. at 1286.
61421 U.S. 975 (1975).
62426 U.S. at 37 (footnotes omitted).
6
3 Id. at 38, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
4 U.S. CoMST. art. HI. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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to be redressed by a favorable decision."65 The Court noted that it had established in an earlier decision that an allegation of actual injury redressable by
the court was sufficient to confer standing upon a plaintiff.6 An allegation
of actual injury is not sufficient. Emphasizing a point that was perhaps fatal
to the plaintiffs, the Court held that "[t]he necessity that the plaintiff who
seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. MI requirement."6 It is clear from the decisions in Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights and Warth that the plaintiff must allege that his
injury will be redressed by the relief sought against the defendant.
The Court, from this standpoint, conceded that the plaintiffs had suffered injury to their interest in access to hospital services" due to the hospitals' refusal to serve them. 9 However, the Court stressed that the injury
suffered by the plaintiffs was at the hands of hospitals, not the Treasury
Department officials who were named as the defendants. It noted that "the
case or controversy' requirement of Art. m still requires that a federal court
act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court."7
The Court pointed out that it did not accept the plaintiffs' position
that the adoption of Revenue Ruling 69-545 bad encouraged hospitals to
deny services to indigents or that injunctive relief against this ruling would
result in the plaintiffs receiving the services they desired. 1 Noting conflicting
evidence from both parties concerning the dependence of nonprofit hospitals
upon private charity, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch conflicting evidence
supports the common sense proposition that the dependence upon special
tax benefits may vary from hospital to hospital." 2 Because the plaintiffs'
allegations did not establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the hospitals
65 426 U.S. at 38. This notion of redressibility is a refinement of the standing limitation developed in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975), which shall be discussed infra. In

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), plaintiffs alleged that Tennessee's legislative apportionment denied them equal protection of the laws through debasement of their votes. They
were assumed to have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy for purposes of
standing because "[tihey [were] asserting a plain, direct and an adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes . . . ." Id. at 207.
66 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1969).
67

426 U.S. at 39.

68 426 U.S. at 40.
69

Id. at
1d. at
71 Id. at
ible that
70

41.
41-42.
43. The Court found that "[s]o far as the complaint sheds light, it is just as plausthe hospitals to which respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo fa-

vorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level
of uncompensated services."
72

Id.
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would be likely to extend services to the plaintiffs if the challenged ruling
were enjoined, the Court concluded that the complaint had not suggested
any substantial likelihood that victory in the suit would result in respondents'
receiving the hospital treatment they desired."
It is quite clear from the decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
that a plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against the IRS must

convincingly allege that the granting of such relief will remedy the injury
inflicted on the plaintiff. The requirement in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights that the challenged government action be the sine qua non of injury
to the plaintiff has important consequences in the tax area. Because of the

limited use of the Anti-Injunction Act when a plaintiff's own tax liability is
involved, most actions for injunctive relief against the IRS, if any are maintainable, must involve allegations of injury to the plaintiff as a result of IRS
treatment of some other taxpayer."
As a result of the decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights it appears that in actions for injunctive or declaratory relief against the IRS, the
further one moves from the Scylla of the Anti-Injunction Act and the De18 Id. at 45-46. In his concurring opinion Justice Brennan agreed that there was a concrete
and reviewable controversy because the plaintiff had not alleged applicability of the challenged ruling to any nonprofit hospitals other than a very narrow category specified by the
ruling. Id. at 47. His opinion lamented the failure of the majority to find standing in view
of its concession that the plaintiffs had suffered injury. Justice Brennan contended that the
Constitution does not command that plaintiffs, for purposes of standing, must allege the
redressibility of the injury:
Nothing in the logic or policy of constitutionally required standing is added by the
further injury-in-fact dimension required by the Court today-that respondents ailege
that the hospitals affecting them would not have elected to forgo the favorable tax
treatment and that this would result in the availability to below-cost medical services.
Id. at 56. Justice Brennan also regarded a prudential limitation such as the majority had
read into the injury-in-fact requirement as "inapposite" to judicial review sought under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the plaintiffs' jurisdictional basis for their claim, citing the
decisions in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); and United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
74 A taxpayer may not bring suit to enjoin a taxation ruling as to his own taxes even when
such a ruling has not resulted in tax liability. See Gardner v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir.
1936), where a taxpayer alleged that a sales tax ruling of the Commissioner concerning refuse
palm oil made it impossible to procure a processor for it. Suit was held barred by the AntiInjunction Act. See also J.C. Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dept., 439 F.2d 63
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), where an importer of television sets from
Japan sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from making an investigation under
the Anti-Dumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (Supp. V 1975), to determine whether the sets
were being sold at less than fair value. Because the investigation could result in the imposition of a tax that could be challenged in the Customs Court the suit was barred by
§ 7421(a). "Where a complete system of review is provided there is no exceptional circumstance to take the case out of the general rule." 439 F.2d 63. But see Common
9512 (D.D.C. 1973), where taxpayers obtained an inCause v. Shultz, 73-2 U.S. TAx CAS.
junction against a temporary regulation, T.D. 7227, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 591 which limited
the time for designation of $1.00 to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund to the time
a taxpayer files his return.
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claratory Judgment Act exception, the closer one gets to the Charybdis of
questionable standing. Yet in deciding Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights on
the basis of lack of standing, the Court did not foreclose the issue of standing of a plaintiff to challenge treatment by the IRS of another taxpayer and
left for another day the issues of reviewability and jurisdiction in such suits.
"These issues were argued vigorously by the Treasury Department. In order
to counteract the notion that Congress, in limiting judicial review of IRS
action, did not contemplate situations in which plaintiffs would seek to litigate tax treatment of others on the basis of public policy or competitive
injury,"5 the government argued that Congress' intent was to limit the courts'
jurisdiction in tax matters and to give the agency as much discretion as
possible. The government stated emphatically in its brief that "[f]rom the
very inception of the Treasury as the tax collecting arm of the federal government, Congress has vested in its officials broad discretion in the enforcement of the revenue laws.' ''
As to the standing issue, the government contended that third parties
could not maintain actions to litigate the tax issues of other taxpayers. The
government likened the discretion of the IRS in administering the tax laws to
prosecutorial discretion. The scope of prosecutorial discretion had recently
been upheld by the Supreme Court in Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,"
an action brought by an unmarried mother who sought to compel state
prosecution against the nonsupporting father of her child. The government
painted a stark picture of the abuse that might result if third persons had
standing to compel the IRS to act concerning other taxpayers:
[']f petitioners can maintain this action, there are many others who
could utilize litigation with the Internal Revenue Service as a sword
to be wielded against adversaries. For example, such litigation might
be brought to compel the Service to audit a particular taxpayer accord75 One

district court has concluded pragmatically that Congress in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act did not consider the possibility of aggrieved third parties seeking to litigate IRS
action vis-a-vis other taxpayers. In a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief by International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp. seeking relief against revocation of a revenue ruling that would
affect its shareholders, the court held:
[Irtis possible that Congress did not consider the applicability of those sections to the

unusual situation presented by the instant suit. In such circumstances, we can be guided
only by the language and apparent purpose of these statutes [the Anti-Injunction Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act exception], both of which counsel dismissal of
district court injunctive actions, whether brought by taxpayers or third parties collaterally
affected by tax assessments.
International Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D. Del.

1975). IT&T's action in this case would clearly have interferred with IRS tax collecting
functions since the Service had assessed deficiencies against a number of JT&T shareholders.

for government at 16, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976).
77 410 U.S. 614 (1973).

7eBrief
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ing to the standards that the plaintiffs insisted were required by the

statute rather than those employed by the Service."'
A large part of the government's argument comprised various reasons
why IRS functions are nonreviewable by the courts except in the limited

circumstances provided for by Congress. This is an important contention because it is obviously aimed at the plaintiffs' reliance on Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 8 as a basis for review and jurisdiction. As
will be discussed hereinafter, there is a strong presumption in the legislative
history of the APA and in the recent cases construing it, which is in favor of

judicial review of agency action at the behest of any party aggrieved by such
action.80 However, the government made several arguments contending that
IRS functions are committed for the most part to the discretion of the agency.
The government seemingly attempted to borrow insulation from the collec-

tion function of the IRS, which for the most part is clearly committed to
agency discretion, contending that "[t]he 'process' of tax collection by the
Department of the Treasury includes the making of administrative determinations such as the Revenue Ruling at issue here."'"
The government exhibited what may have been a calculated ambiva-

lence concerning the rulings function; if it is not committed to agency discretion as part of the tax collection function, then it is not the sort of
concrete agency action that created a ripe and justiciable controversy. The

government stated that "[s]uch a ruling is informational in character and
represents an announcement of position in much the same way as a speech
by a Treasury official or an argument presented to a court."8'
It was emphasized by the government that the office of Commissioner
of Internal Revenue was created in 1862 and that the Commissioner since
that time has been authorized to issue rulings pertaining to the tax laws.83
T

sBrief for government at 17, 426 U.S. 26.
79 5 U.S.C. § 702, as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574,
80 "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof . . . ." Id.
8
Brief for government at 20, 426 U.S. 26.
8
2 Id. at 26.
88 Id. at 38. The statute creating the Office of the Commissioner, Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
8, § 321, 12 Stat. 432-33 indicates that its "rule-making" function was far more similar to
that under I.R.C. § 7805(c) pertaining to forms and blanks rather than the current rulings
function under I.R.C. § 7805(a):
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall have general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all duties and taxes now or hereafter imposed by any law providing internal revenue; and
shall prepare and distribute all the instructions, regulations, directions, forms, blanks,
stamps and other matters pertaining to the assessment and collection of internal revenue.
The Commissioner's function appears to have been limited to administrative details. At least
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A holding that the federal courts could review IRS revenue rulings would
be inconsistent with the intent of Congress. There is no evidence that Congress ever intended to give the courts any authority to review tax suits other
than in the form of basic jurisdiction to hear deficiency or refund cases
brought by taxpayers contesting their own liability.8"
Applying the above rationale to the facts in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights, the only persons or entities whose claims the federal courts could
ultimately review would be the hospitals or their donors. However, it is
highly unlikely that any taxpayer benefited by IRS action, regardless of its
legality, would challenge it. Although this would render a significant part
of IRS action unreviewable by the courts in all but the most limited circumstances,85 control over the IRS to ensure proper administration of the tax
laws is to be exercised by Congress through its Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation.8"
According to the IRS view, the federal courts may not review IRS
action unless it ultimately involves a dispute involving the liability of a particular taxpayer in a refund suit or in the Tax Court. Congressional oversight
rather than judicial review is designed to ensure that IRS actions comply with
the tax laws.
The government also maintained that the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act bar actions that would affect the tax liability of
others.8 7 What is anomalous about that contention in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights is that the only plausible consequences of the relief sought
by the plaintiffs would be that federal revenues would increase, because of
the nondeductibility of contributions to hospitals involved and possible
FUTA tax liability of the hospitals themselves, or they would stay the same.
The government thus asked the Court to go a step beyond Bob Jones University and "Americans United" Inc., where a diminution of third parties'
one district court has noted this distinction, holding that rulings, as opposed to paperwork
functions, were reviewable. National Restaurant Ass'n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 933, 999
(D.D.C. 1976). See infra, note 257.
84 Brief for government at 42, 426 U.S. 26.
85 One exception to the nonreviewability of government action has been clearly, if narrowly,
established. Under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), if Congress or federal officials exceed a specific constitutional limitation in exercising the taxing and spending power conferred by art. I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, such abuse may be challenged judicially by a
taxpayer. The Court held that "[s]uch an injury is appropriate for judicial redress, and the
taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his status and the nature of the allegedly
unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure judicial review." 392 U.S.
at 106.
88 Delegation of IRS control is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 8001, 8002, 8021, 8022 (1970). Brief
for government at 43, 426 U.S. 26.
97 Brief for government at 59, 61.
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tax liability was threatened, and apply the bar of Section 7421(a) in a
situation that had no real relation to the expeditious collection of federal
revenues. The government advanced the following rationale in supporting
applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act to the situation in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights:
It would be anomalous to impute to Congress the intent to bar injunctive
actions by taxpayers who are directly affected by the collection of their
tax liability but to permit non-taxpayers whose interests are far more
tangential to enjoin the administrative determinations of the Treasury
and thereby affect the tax liability of countless numbers of taxpayers."
If the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is simply the preservation of federal revenues from undue preassessment judicial interference, then it is not
necessarily anomalous to permit actions for injunction that will in no way
interfere with revenue collections. This should be the case particularly
where the plaintiff in such an action, unlike the taxpayer whose tax liability
is'in question, cannot remedy his grievance in the Tax Court or by a refund
suit.
The government urged that a broad construction be given to the tax
exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act. It urged rejection of the notion
that the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act is limited to that of the AntiInjunction Act, which is solely the assessment and collection of taxes." The
government characterized the plaintiffs' suit as an "attempt to obtain a judicial
redeclaration concerning the tax liabilities of other parties" and contended
that, as such, it was barred."0
The final significant point made by the government was that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity." This doctrine
has a very complicated history and is riddled with exceptions." The doctrine
has been roundly criticized"3 and yet has sometimes been used successfully

88Id. at 63.
89ld. at 64.
90 Id. at 69-70.

91 Id. at 70.
9Compare Lank v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) with Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
98 Eg., Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971) where
Judge McGowan commented in his concurring opinion: "The doctrine itself is in a considerable state of disrepair, at least in terms of intellectual respectability; and it is hardly in the
original condition of pristine purity which once made it a useful tool for government lawyers
seeking to dispense with trials on the merits." 448 F.2d at 1051.
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against plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against the IRS-" The defense has
probably been deprived of validity in nontaxpayer suits by the 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act which eliminates the sovereign

immunity defense in actions against a federal agency, its officers or employees." If the Anti-Injunction Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act exception and some overriding congressional purpose to insulate IRS action do
not prevent nontaxpayers from seeking review of IRS action, then sovereign
immunity should not now do so.
Assuming the inapplicability of sovereign immunity to most actions
for injunctive or declaratory relief against agency action, the government
brief in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights raises, and the Court's decision
leaves open, three crucial questions: 1) does a plaintiff whose own tax lia-

bility is not affected ever have standing to challenge IRS action concerning
the taxes of another, 2) has Congress determined that IRS action, with the
exception of refund and Tax Court suits, is not open to judicial review, and

3) does the Anti-Injunction Act even bar suits that would result in an increase
of federal revenues and is the Declaratory Judgment Act exception so broad
as to prevent any action for declaratory relief pertaining to federal taxation?
It. STANDING REQUIREMENTS AFTER SIMON V.
EASTERN KENTUCKY WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION

Two recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions demonstrate
that Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights has not laid to rest the question of

standing in actions challenging IRS treatment of third parties. These decisions
are Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal,9" and American Society of
Travel Agents, Inc. (ASTA) v. Blumenthal." These two decisions are linked
together by a common dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon.' The facts of
See Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub nom. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia
v. United States Jaycees, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
95 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 provides that in an action
other than one for damages that:
[A] claim that an agency or that an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act
in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United
States is an indispensible party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any
such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States.
The report of the House Judiciary Committee accompanying the legislation, H.R. REp. No.
94-1656, 87th Cong., 2d Sess 1, 1962, states that, "the proposed legislation would amend
section 702 of title 5, U.S.C., so as to remove the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar
to judicial review of Federal administrative action otherwise subject to judicial review."
9640 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5232 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1977), petition for cert. filed 46
U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1977).
97 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5782 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1977).
98 Id.at 77-5787. Judge Bazelon's dissent was not reported in the Tax Analysts and Advocates
opinion.
94
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the cases are quite similar and yet the two opinions contrast sharply concerning injury in fact. In Tax Analysts and Advocates, the plaintiffs were a
"tax reform" organization 9 and its executive director, Thomas Field, who
had purchased an entire working interest in an domestic oil well. The suit
was for declaratory and injunctive relief against IRS revenue rulings permitting domestic oil corporations to take a tax credit for income taxes paid to
Saudi Arabia,'0 0 Libya, 10' Iran, Kuwait and Venezuela' in connection with
oil production in those countries.0 3 The plaintiffs contended that such taxes
were in reality royalties or excise or severance taxes' 0' and not foreign income taxes creditable under the Code. 105 Plaintiff Field contended that allowing international oil companies to credit such payments against United States
income tax liability, rather than to deduct the payments from gross income,
permitted the companies to sell such foreign oil in the United States at lower
prices. This caused Field, who was permitted to deduct royalty payments
to the owner of his domestic well only from gross income, to lose potential
income from the sale of his domestically produced oil. Field contended
further that as a result of this higher net income potential, the value of foreign oil investments was increased relative to domestic oil investments which
placed him in a competitively disadvantageous position."e
Citing Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights'"° the court had no trouble in
finding injury in fact in Field's capacity as a competitor. Unlike the court
in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, the court in Tax Analysts and Advocates regarded "redressability" as a "prudential limitation" on federal court
jurisdiction.0 8 The court determined that satisfaction of the injury-in-fact
requirement with so trivial an injury as that allegedly suffered by Field was
99 See Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974). See also
note 250 and accompanying text infra.
10o Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 386.
101 Rev.
102

Rul. 68-552, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 306.

These were allegedly private revenue rulings. See 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5232, 77-5234.
103 Rev. Rul. 55-296 and Rev. Rul. 68-552 have been revoked by the IRS. See Rev. Rul.

78-63, 1978-8 INT. REV. BuLL. 18.
104 I.R.C. § 901(a).
105

I.R.C. § 901(b).

10e Perhaps the entry of Field into the oil business prior to the suit was an attempt to avoid

the pitfalls encountered by the plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Sierra
Club, a well known conservation organization contesting the construction of a ski resort
in the Sequoia National Forest, was deemed not to have standing because it did not allege
that any of its members would be affected by the development. The government regarded
Field's competitor status as disingenuous concluding that "[u]nder any realistic view, Field
is not a competitor of the oil companies involved in the challenged rulings. Field's annual
income of $200 from his wells is trivial by any standard." Brief for government at 26-27,
40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5232.
10
7 Id. at 77-5236 n.47.
10

' 8ld. at 77-5236.
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amply justified by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United
0 9 The question of redressability, i.e., whether reversal of
States v. SCRAP."
the IRS action would probably result in increased net income and enhanced
desirability for Field's domestic oil investment, was not reached. Instead the
court rejected the plaintiff's standing on the basis of a prudential limitation,
the test being "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.""' It is sensible in terms
of the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement to demand that a
plaintiff challenging a particular illegal action be an intended beneficiary or
subject of the legislative provision allegedly violated. Nevertheless, the zone
of interests test has never been constitutionalized and has never been used
by the Supreme Court in the manner in which it was employed in Tax Analysts and Advocates.
The Supreme Court introduced the zone test in two decisions handed
down together, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp'' and Barlow v. Collins."2 In Data ProcessingService the Court held
that plaintiffs who sold data processing services could challenge a ruling by
the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted national banks to make
data processing services available to other banks and bank customers. The
plaintiffs contended that such a ruling was contrary to Section 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act of 1962" 8 which prohibited bank service corporations from engaging in any activity other than the provision of bank services
to banks. Although the relevant statutory provision did not mention data
processing companies the Court held that such companies were arguably
protected by the statute because of a congressional interest in protecting
competitors of national banks in nonbanking fields."'
In Barlow the plaintiffs were tenant farmers who challenged a regulation
of the Secretary of Agriculture which permitted assignment of support payments received by tenant farmers under the Food and Agriculture Act of
1965111 to rent for a farm. The tenant farmers contended that this regulation
permitted their landlords to coerce them into making assignments of support
benefits for rent, requiring them to secure financing for other farm needs
from the landlords at inflated prices. The court of appeals affirmed the dis109 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973). The Court held that an "identifiable trifle" was sufficient to confer standing.
11040 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5236 citing 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
'11 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
12 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
§ 1864 (1970).
124 397 U.S. at 155.
11s 12 U.S.C.
1157

US.C. § 1444(d) (1970).
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trict court's dismissal of the action on the basis that the plaintiffs had shown
no invasion of a legally protected interest.11" However, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding a general congressional intent in the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1965 to protect the interests of the tenant farmers. 1 " It is clear from
Data Processing Service and Barlow that in order to determine whether a
plaintiff is arguably someone to be protected by legislation upon which he
attempts to posit standing, the Court has sanctioned reference to the legislative history of a provision or to other portions of a single act that may be
relevant.
In a subsequent decision, Arnold Tours v. Camp,"" which also involved
Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act,"" the Supreme Court held
that travel agents had standing to challenge a regulation of the Comptroller
of the Currency permitting national banks to provide travel service to their
with
customers. The Court noted that national banks are competing
20
customers.
to
services
travel
provide
they
when
travel agents
It is clear that the zone of interests of a statute cannot be determined
solely by a mechanical examination of the text of the provision upon which
the plaintiff bases his case. This, however, was how the court in Tax Analysts and Advocates applied the zone test. The court insisted that it would
look only to the language of Section 901 in evaluating whether plaintiffs
such as Field were to be regarded as within the zone of interests. The court
also determined that it would not be proper to examine the legislative history
of the provision upon which the allegations of illegality were based. Therefore it held that an examination of the legislative history might lead to prejudgment on the merits, that it might be "unilluminating" as to what interests
are to be protected and that the "generous" nature of the zone test might
be undermined by a requirement that a plaintiff make an affirmative showing
of congressional intent when asserting standing."
I.R.C. Section 901 refers specifically to a credit for foreign taxes paid
by United States citizens or domestic corporations. In Tax Analysts and Advocates, the plaintiff paid no taxes and, therefore, under the court's analysis,
lacked textual support for his claim that his interests were protected by Section
901. The court determined from the text of Section 901 that its purpose was to
prevent double taxation of domestic taxpayers paying foreign taxes and
116
"'l

398 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1968).
397 U.S. at 164-65.

I's 400 U.S. 45 (1970)

(per curiam).

9

" Supra note 113.
400 U.S. at 46.
22140 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-523S.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 6
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1

that the plaintiff could not be regarded as falling within that regulatory concern "without stretching the concept of regulation to implausible limits."'12
While it is strongly implied in Data Processing Service and Arnold
Tours that agency action taken pursuant to statutory authority might be
challenged by a plaintiff whose interests Congress most likely knew would
be affected by such regulation, the court sidestepped this issue by characterizing it as a "reverse zone of interests analysis."' 3 The plaintiff in Tax Anaalysts and Advocates contended that he had standing because Section 901
could be read as a decision by Congress not to grant a tax credit to persons
who have made payments other than taxes to foreign governments. Despite
the obvious impact that an IRS departure from that congressional limitation
would have on the plaintiff,"' the court concluded:
Every decision by a government agency generates consequences and
various forms of impact on a wide range of valid interests held by a
diverse range of parties. There is no doubt that the decisions embodied
in the challenged revenue rulings have had an impact upon appellant
Field. But the concepts of consequence and impact are not the proper
guideposts to define the relevant zone of interests; reference to those
concepts does not aid greatly in determining whether a protected interest exists .. .
Judge Bazelon, in his joint dissent to Tax Analysts and Advocates and
ASTA 12 criticized the determination of the majority not to review other
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or the legislative history of the specific provision. Judge Bazelon noted the plaintiff's contention that the Code in
its entirety is infused with certain general purposes.' Viewing Section 901
in a larger sense, as an attempt to establish equality between corporations
required to pay foreign taxes and those required only to pay United States
taxes, it may be seen as encompassing the plaintiff's interest in maintaining
tax parity with other oil producers. 8
Judge Bazelon noted that the legislative history of Section 901 is silent
122

Id. at 77-5240.

128

d. at 77-5241.
It should be noted that the court conceded the requisite injury-in-fact to the plaintiff.
Id. at 77-5236.
124

1251d. at 77-5241.

Judge Bazelon's dissent to both cases was reported in the ASTA decision.
40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5798. Judge Bazelon noted the reference by the plaintiff to
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954), accompanying the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, "[iun general, the purpose of these changes has been to remove inequities,
to end harassment of the taxpayer and to reduce barriers to future expansion of production
and employment."
128 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5799.
126

127
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concerning persons such as the plaintiff in Tax Analysts and Advocates.1 9
Thus the language of the majority concerning the role of legislative history
in application of the zone test appears to have had little practical consequence. Nevertheless, Judge Bazelon's criticism of the majority's rejection
of legislative history is compelling. As to the contention that an examination
of the legislative history may lead to prejudgment of the merits, the dissent
noted that "[w]e trust federal judges to successfully perform such tasks all
the time, as for example when ruling on the admissibility of evidence in nonjury trials. Standing and the merits require distinct inquiries, and federal
judges are perfectly capable of using legislative history to answer the demands of each."12 0
As to the majority's contention that the legislative history might be
"unilluminating" the dissent commented that "there is no way of knowing
until one looks."'' Finally, concerning the contention that resorting to the
legislative history might contract the generosity of the zone test, the dissent
contended that "if the determination of congressional intent is relevant, the
use of legislative history may lead to more accurate application of the test."3
The majority's application of the zone test should not be regarded as
a serious obstacle to plaintiffs in suits challenging IRS action because it has
no support in the case law. In addition, the court demonstrated no reason why
precedents in other areas of federal regulation are not relevant in suits against
the IRS. The majority's rejection of the plaintiff's standing in Tax Analysts
and Advocates appears to have little support.
Several cases, in addition to Data ProcessingService and Arnold Tours,
make it clear that competitors impacted by action allegedly pursuant to
statutory authority have standing to challenge the legality of such action.
This is true regardless of whether such plaintiffs are mentioned specifically
in the statutory provision they allege has been violated. "3 8
The decisions in Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe and Catovsky-Kaplan Physical Therapy Association v. United States are particularly
instructive."' In Ray Baillie Trash Hauling trash haulers sued the Small
129

Id.

'sold. at 77-5798.
11

Id.

'132ld.
188 Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d
779 (2d Cir. 1970); Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 701 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974); Catovsky-Kaplan Physical Therapy Ass'n,
Ltd. v. United States, 507 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1975); Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447 (D.C.

Cir. 1977).
284Supra note 133.
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Business Administration (SBA) demanding that they be permitted to bid
for a trash hauling contract awarded to a minority owned business. The
court determined that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the SBA action
because, as a small business, its interests were arguably within those to be
protected by the Small Business Act.'
In Catovsky-Kaplan Physical Therapy Association, private physical therapy corporations challenged an HEW regulation requiring nonprofit home
health agencies to contract only with nonprofit corporations for physical
therapy."' The plaintiffs alleged that they had been notified that some of their
physical therapy contracts might be terminated because of the regulation. The
government contended that the zone of interests test was not met because the
regulation purports to regulate only home health agencies. The court held,
however, that:
if, pursuant to what it perceives to be its statutory authority, a government agency regulates the contractual relationships between a regulated
and an unregulated party, the latter as well as the former may have
interests that are arguably within the regulated zone for purposes of
testing standing, and for this purpose a total prohibition is a form of
regulation."3 '
In both of these cases the impact of regulation upon competitors of
those regulated was readily foreseeable. Thus, it would not have been inconsistent with congressional intent to permit such competitors to challenge
regulations that drastically affect their interests. It must be noted that the
threshold requirement for standing is not that the plaintiff's interests be
clearly within the zone of interests to be protected but, rather, that they be
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected." 8 If the impact of a
revenue ruling on its "beneficiary's" competitors might readily have been
foreseen by Congress, the overwhelming weight of authority indicates that
such competitors should have standing to challenge such a ruling.
In considering the relevant zones of interests in any challenge to a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code, a court should be mindful of the
congressional purpose that the ruling's function be exercised in such a way
as to promote equality among taxpayers. Although the IRS has considerable
discretion in determining how to avoid inequities among taxpayers,8 9 this
discretion is not unfettered.
185 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-96 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
186 20 C.F.R. § 405.1221(a) (1973).

is'507 F.2d at 1367.
238 See 379 U.S. 150.
289 See Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957).
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In International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, '0
International Business Machines (IBM) challenged a refusal by the IRS to
treat it in a manner similar to its competitor, Remington Rand. Remington
had received a ruling for a two year period that some of its computers were
not business machines subject to the business machines excise tax of the
Code.' The IRS revoked the ruling favorable to Remington but did not
apply its revocation retroactively. IBM had never received a comparable
ruling. IBM did not dispute that its computers similar to the favored Remington machines were "business machines." It asserted, however, that the
unequal treatment of its competitor invalidated IBM's excise taxes for the
same period. The court agreed, noting:
Plaintiff's statutory right to this type of equal protection is not cut off
by its omission to prove that it lost business by virtue of the discriminatory treatment. The inequality inheres in the payment of tax by IBM
and its customers while Remington and its customers were allowed to
go free .... The Code does not demand any special or greater proof of
harm as a condition of recovery for an abuse of discretion under Section 7805(b). 112
Also relevant in this regard is the decision of the Court of Claims in
Exchange Parts Co. v. United States." 3 In that case the court held
that the IRS could not make a ruling nonretroactive to some taxpayers dependent solely upon whether or not they had already paid their taxes. Thus,
in evaluating whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the tax treatment
of others, a court must consider not only whether the impact of the action
under the particular Code provision on competitors was forseeable, but also
whether the plaintiff's interests are protected under the general protection
for equity among taxpayers provided by the Code.
The cases cited by Judge Bazelon in his dissent in Tax Analysts and
Advocates clearly support his contention that consideration of the legislative
history is permissable in determining whether a plaintiff is within the zone
of interests to be protected by an enactment.4' The majority in Tax Analysts
and Advocates cited no direct authority for this tightening of the zone of
interests test and it appears to be contrary to the Supreme Court decisions
T

14 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
141 I.R.C. § 1491 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 206, 79 Stat. 140).
142 343 F.2d at 924.

143 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
'"City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971); Secretary of
Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973); Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d
757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas,
509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Rental Housing Ass'n v.
Hills, 548 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1977). See also Concerned Residents v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29
(3d Cir. 1976).
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in Data Processing Service, Barlow and Arnold Tours. Furthermore, its
validity even within the District of Columbia circuit is questionable considering the subsequent decision rendered in Southern Mutual Help Association, Inc. v. Califano."'
In Southern Mutual Help Association a migrant worker health facility
challenged HEW's discontinuance of its funding without a hearing. The
court considered whether a facility whose funding had been discontinued
would have standing to challenge agency action when the agency had substituted another facility and there was no interruption of service to the obvious beneficiaries of the funding, the migrant workers.'" The court concluded that Congress tacitly recognized that conduit organizations such as
the plaintiff were necessary to deliver the contemplated services and that the
plaintiff's interests were therefore within the zone of interests to be protected. " '
Thus, it appears that the interpretation of the zone of interests test in Tax
Analysts and Advocates has not been conclusively accepted by the District
of Columbia circuit.
In ASTA, the District of Columbia circuit affirmed the dismissal by
the district court of a suit by an association of travel agents contesting IRS
tax treatment of tax-exempt organizations that had become involved in
preparing tour packages for their membership. The plaintiff contended that
the tax-exempt status of such organizations enabled them to sell tour packages at lower prices than private travel agents and that the IRS had thus
bestowed an unfair competitive advantage on such organizations. It was also
contended that if such organizations conducted large scale travel businesses
they were no longer entitled to tax-exempt treatment.' 8 The plaintiff urged
that such nonprofit organizations be accorded the same income tax treatment as private travel agents.
The court, relying on the decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights,
held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact and thus lacked
standing." 9 The court held that the plaintiff had not indicated with sufficient
specificity the manner in which the alleged injury had occurred, i.e., that it
had not alleged in its complaint that prospective customers had spumed its
members because of the IRS tax treatment of tax-exempt organizations that
had entered the travel business.
The court insisted that this result was mandated by the decision in
574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"sSee 42 U.S.C. § 242(h) (1970).
147 574 F.2d at 524.
'it I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
21940 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5784, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
145
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Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights. The court concluded that the plaintiff
had not shown that its members would receive any tangible benefit from the
relief sought because the tax-exempt organizations might still benefit from
volunteer labor and willingness to accept lower profits, the organization's
members might still prefer tour packages of their own organizations at higher
prices, or the members of such organizations might simply travel less.""0
The court distinguished Data ProcessingService on the basis that it was not
a tax case and that, unlike the national banks in Data Processing Service,
the tax-exempt organizations would still be able to remain in business competing with the plaintiffs even if the plaintiffs were successful.'
This determination appears very difficult to reconcile with the finding
by a different panel in Tax Analysts and Advocates, considering that the
court did determine in that case that the plaintiff had suffered competitive
injury because of the tax credit accorded to importers of foreign oil. Judge
Bazelon was also a member of the ASTA panel and dissented from the majority holding. His dissent was based largely upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.' In that case the plaintiffs were investment fund companies who challenged a regulation of the
Comptroller of the Currency authorizing national banks to establish and
operate collective investment funds. The court determined that the plaintiff
had standing to maintain the suit and that the alleged creation of illegal
competition by agency action met the injury-in-fact requirement."5
Judge Bazelon disputed the majority's conclusion that Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights mandated dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. His dissent
emphasized that the plaintiffs in that case had failed to make a showing that
the hospitals would offer free inpatient services to indigents rather than lose
donations deductible to the donors."' The dissent noted that if ASTA had
received the relief sought, the taxes of its competitors would rise and their
costs would increase. Judge Bazelon referred to the suggestions of the majority regarding ways in which the tax-exempt organizations could maintain
their customers despite higher tax liability as "corrosive skepticism [that]
would altogether eliminate competitive injury as a basis for standing."' 55
Concerning the contention that the tax-exempt organizations, unlike the
national banks in Data Processing Service, would still remain in business,
Judge Bazelon noted that this went only to the degree of injury suffered and
40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5786.
Id. at 77-5784.
152401 U.S. 617 (1971).
150
151

15 3 Id. at 620.
154 40 Am.
285 Id.

Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5793.
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that 56only a very small degree of injury was required for purposes of stand1

ing.

Despite the apparent cogency of Judge Bazelon's dissent, several recent
decisions of the Supreme Court in the area of standing indicate that the

redressability component of the injury-in-fact requirement is a much more
serious roadblock to standing by one seeking to challenge IRS action concerning another taxpayer than the prudential zone of interest test. The Court

has clearly made standing a more difficult matter in this regard. Despite the
generosity of the decision specifying the quantity of injury required,"' the

plaintiff must allege that he himself has suffered such injury."58 This requirement of a personal stake in the controversy has been upheld in the tax area

on several occasions."" The injury alleged can not be a generalized grievance common to all citizens of the United States or an abstract grievance.'"

Nevertheless, the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that his injury,
however slight, will be redressed by the relief sought has been the most important area of tightening up the standing requirements.
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.'11 the Supreme Court held that a mother
did not have standing to challenge the refusal of state prosecuting attorneys

to prosecute the father of her illegitimate child for failure to support such
'5id.
at 77-5794, citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
257 412 U.S. 669.
5
'1 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In a few instances organizational plaintiffs or
plaintiffs not directly suffering injury have been accorded standing to protect the interests of
third parties. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
See also Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court held that members of the military reserves not under orders to report to the Indochina theatre did not
have standing to challenge use of military personnel in Cambodia.
158 For examples of dismissals of actions on the basis that alleged illegality on the part of
the IRS had befallen individuals other than the plaintiffs, see Matthews v. United States
Treasury Dep't, 60 F.R.D. 212 (C.D.Cal. 1973) and Dennison v. United States, 31 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 2d 73-1348 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1973).
For examples of refund suits which were dismissed because taxpayers other than the plaintiff had paid the tax, see Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 748 (Ct.
Cl. 1955) and Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. United States, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 6340 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 31, 1964).
But see International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D.
Del. 1975), where the court found sufficient injury-in-fact in that IT&T would be forced
to defend suits brought by numerous shareholders of an acquired corporation who detrimentally relied upon its representations concerning the taxfree character of a merger.
16oSee Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), where military
reservists were denied standing to challenge service by members of Congress in the military
reserves under U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. See also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayers may challenge federal
spending program if they demonstrate the requisite personal stake in the outcome).
181410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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child. The Court concluded that prosecution of the father would result only
in his being convicted of a completed offense and jailed. Whether that would
result in payment of support was regarded as speculative at best.18
The redressability requirement was re-emphasized in Warth v. Seldin,"13
in which organizations and individuals in Rochester, New York challenged
the zoning ordinances of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester. The plaintiffs alleged that the zoning ordinances had been used to exclude low and
moderate income persons by allocating most of the town's land to relatively
expensive single family housing. The Court held:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred
that, absent the respondent's restrictive zoning practices, there is a
substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase or
lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the
asserted inability of petitioners will be removed. '"
The Court noted the difficult burden imposed on plaintiffs alleging injury at
the hands of third parties because of government action.18 5 The Court noted
that the individual plaintiffs who alleged that they desired housing in Penfield had not indicated that they had financial resources sufficient to obtain
housing in any of the contemplated projects. The Court concluded that
"their individual financial situations and housing needs suggest.., that their
inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the
area housing market, rather than of the respondents' assertedly illegal
acts."'"
A more recent decision of the Supreme Court indicates that the court
in ASTA went too far in requiring the plaintiff to negate every possibility
under which it might still suffer competition if relief against the IRS was
granted. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,e one of the
plaintiffs, a development corporation, applied for rezoning of a fifteen acre
parcel from single family to multiple family classification in order to construct housing for low income persons. The Court agreed that the corporation had standing to challenge the refusal to rezone on the basis that it
constituted an absolute barrier to construction of such housing. The Court
162 Id. at 618. Perhaps equally important to the decision was the court's conclusion that "in
American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in

the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Id. at 619.
163422 US. 490 (1975).
264

Id. at 504.

e5 a. at 505.
268 Id. at 506.
161 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also National Ass'n of Neighborhood Health Centers v. Mat-

thews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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noted that the corporate plaintiff would still have to qualify for financing
and federal subsidies and that rezoning would not guarantee construction of
the project."' It determined, however, that "[w]hen a project is as detailed
as [the plaintiff's], a court is not required to engage in undue speculation as
a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in
the controversy."' 9
The decision in Arlington Heights makes it clear that the plaintiff must
assert the likelihood, not the inevitability, that the injury he suffers will be
alleviated by cessation of the allegedly illegal action. Thus, if illegal action
of the IRS stiffens ASTA's competition, a plaintiff is required to allege only
that the demanded relief would restore the competitive equilibrium that
would exist without the illegal action. To require that the plaintiff convincingly allege that the requested relief would eradicate all competition, as does
the opinion in ASTA, is a misapplication of Data ProcessingService, Arnold
Tours, Investment Co. Institute and many other decisions involving standing
predicated on competitive injury.
Where a plaintiff has suffered competitive injury because a federal
agency has violated a federal statute designed to protect competitive interests,
that plaintiff has standing to challenge the alleged illegality. This principle
was firmly established in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co. " " This does not
mean that a party suffering from competition a fortiori has standing to challenge government action even when the government is fostering lawful competition.' But when an agency is authorized to protect competition, then
an interested competitor has standing to challenge those departures from the
congressional intent that illegally impair competitive balance.""
Cases in the lower federal courts since Kentucky Utilities Co. have
clearly demonstrated an inclination to grant a competitor standing when it
is arguably called for by the statutory provision at issue. In Curranv. Laird'"
the National Maritime Union and its members were held to have standing
1" 429 U.S. at 261.
I" Id.
170 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968), citing the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 58 (1924).
IT' Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA,306 U.S. 118 (1939).
7
1 2 This is consistent with the Court's construction of § 402(b) of the Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970), in Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940), wherein licensees economically injured by grant of broadcasting licenses to others
were permitted to challenge such grants of licenses. The Court concluded that Congress "may.
have been of the opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license
would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate
court errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the license." The doctrine of
cempetitor standing became so entrenched in the communications industry that economic injury was the only basis for challenge of a license. This notion was rejected in the Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
JT3 4Z0 F.24 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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to sue the Secretary of Defense for an alleged violation of the Cargo Preference Act.7 In Scanwell Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer, 175 one of the leading
cases on competitor standing and the reviewability of federal agency action,
a disappointed second lowest bidder for a FAA contract was held to have
standing to challenge the agency's acceptance of the lowest bid on the allegation that the bid was nonresponsive.'

Of course, competitive economic injury is not the only sort of injury
that will confer standing on a plaintiff;' however, a court may not turn a
deaf ear to allegations of competitive injury at the hands of the IRS by distinguishing cases such as Data Processing Service on the basis that they are
not tax cases. The court in ASTA erred in doing so. The IRS, in its rulings

function, has a responsibility to maintain competitive equilibrium whenever
Congress mandates such equilibrium. The IRS can be called to account for
its actions at the behest of parties injured when it fails to implement Congress' mandates.

Plaintiffs bringing actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the IRS should not be limited by the narrow constructions of standing requirements in Tax Analysts and Advocates and ASTA because those holdings

are unjustified in light of other authority. No legislative addition to the jurisdiction of the federal courts is necessary for such suits, particularly when
they are based upon competitive injury. The APA, as construed by the federal courts, provides sufficient basis for such standing.
Im. REVIEWABILITY

OF

IRS

ACTION UNDER THE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

Cases such as Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, Tax Analysts and Advocates, ASTA and others' 7 demonstrate that IRS action, particularly in its
114 10 U.S.C.

§ 2631 (1970).

175424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
176

See also Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, sub nom. Gateway Center Corp. v. Merriam, 414 U.S. 911 (1973); William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department
of the Army of the United States, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973); Constructores Civiles de
Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
868 (1972); Ballerina Pen Co., Inc. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, sub nom. National Industries for the Blind v. Ballerina Pen Co., Inc. 401 U.S. 950
(1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Trailways of New England,
Inc. v. C.A.B., 412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
177 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Cong. v.
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 935 (1967).
This is also true in the context of actions against the IRS. See Tax Analysts and Advocates
v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974) and Common Cause v. Shultz, 73-2 U.S. TAX
CAS. 119592 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1973).
1T8E.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), and Center for Corporate
Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973).
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rulings function, may often be alleged to have consequences transcending
the collection of revenues. Although the plaintiffs in these cases alleged that
action by the IRS resulted in some sort of injury to them because of improper interpretation of the tax laws, it is most unlikely that the IRS action
in those instances could ever have been tested judicially through a refund
suit or in the Tax Court. In his dissent in "'AmericansUnited" Inc. Justice
Blackmun decried the power of the IRS to make social policy, a power that
might imperil an exempt organization without prior checks and balances
provided by judicial review.' 79 Justice Blackmun's views are well-founded
based upon developments in other areas of federal regulation.
While "Americans United" Inc. or a donor may have had an opportunity to challenge the allegedly erroneous action of the Commissioner, it
is doubtful that the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, Tax Analysts and Advocates and ASTA would have had such opportunities. If the
plaintiffs therein had alleged social or competitive harm resulting from illegal

activity of agencies other than the IRS, it is clear that, assuming standing
requirements are met, review would be available in the federal courts. In
recent years the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have greatly expanded the scope of administrative action that may be reviewed under the
80
APA.'
There presently exists a strong presumption in favor of reviewability of
agency action in the federal courts. In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner,""'
drug manufacturers challenged a regulation issued by the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs 8 ' requiring that each instance of a drug's proprietary name
on its label be accompanied by the drug's established (generic) name. The
plaintiffs sought pre-enforcement review of the regulation. The court of
appeals held that such review was beyond the jurisdiction of the district
court.' 83 The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court,
noted that the manufacturers as a result of the regulation, were placed in
the position of having to change all of the labels on their stock and all of
their advertisements before obtaining judicial review:
I'9 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
180 See notes 79 & 80 supra.
181 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962). The government brief
in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights attempts to distinguish the Court's decisions on reviewability of the decisions of other agencies. "Mhe court's decisions with respect to the availability of judicial review of other agency actions under the provisions of other statutes . ..
have no bearing on the jurisdictional questions presented here." Brief of government at 58.

Whether this is correct in light of the legislative history of the APA shall be examined
infra.

113See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
Is3 352 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where
a regulation requires immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs'
conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to non-compliance, access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
the Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory
bar or some other unusual circumstance. '
Decisions of the Supreme Court since Abbott Laboratories indicate
that the availability of judicial review of agency action is not limited to
instances where the plaintiff is caught between severe penalties for noncompliance and considerable expense for compliance with an allegedly invalid
agency determination. Indeed, these cases demonstrate that nonreviewability
of federal agency action at the behest of individuals or entities aggrieved is
exceptional.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,185 private citizens and
local and national conservation organizations were permitted to challenge
approval by the Secretary of Transportation of an interstate highway route
through a public park. The plaintiffs contended that the Federal Highway
Act of 1968188 prohibited the Secretary from authorizing highway construction through a public park if feasible and prudent alternative routes existed
and alleged that the Secretary had not indicated why there were no such
feasible and prudent alternative routes. The Court, citing Abbott Laboratories, held that the determination approving the highway route was reviewable absent a showing that Congress sought to prevent judicial review.",
In Dunlop v. Bachowski'88 the court held that a determination of the
Secretary of Labor not to set aside a union election could be reviewed in an
action by a defeated union election candidate. The court held that "[j]udicial
review of a final agency action will not be cut off unless there is persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."1 89
The strong presumption of reviewability of federal agency action arising
from the above decisions has ample support in the legislative history of the
APA as expressed in the report of the House Judiciary Committee:

184 387 U.S. at 153.
15401

U.S. 402 (1971).

18823 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).

287 387 U.S. at 103.
188421 U.S. 560 (1975).
19 Id. at 567. See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1971), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in
withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing
evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent
to withhold review.1 90
Althouigh there is no statute which provides for judicial or any other sort of
review of the issuance of a revenue ruling,19 ' it could be argued that anyone
aggrieved by such IRS action, if some sort of injury can be established,
should be able to seek judicial review of the action under Section 10 of the
APA since there is no explicit prohibition against such review.
In its brief in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, the government, as
noted above, made essentially two arguments: that the revenue ruling
process is informational, and, therefore, not subject to interference by the
courts under the APA; and that Congress intended in passage of the AntiInjunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act exception to exclude the
federal courts from general review authority over administration of the internal revenue laws.
As to the first contention, an appropriate method of framing the inquiry might be to consider whether the issuance of a revenue ruling by the
IRS possesses sufficient finality of administrative action to permit review
under the APA. On several occasions, the issuance of a rule, regulation, or
interpretation has been sufficient to create a justiciable controversy. In Abbott
Laboratories, the promulgation of a regulation adversely affecting a manufacturer was sufficient for judicial review. In Columbia BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. United States,' a decision that antedated the APA, the Supreme
Court held that a federal court had jurisdiction over a CBS challenge to FCC
licensing regulations. The challenged regulations prohibited granting of
licenses to radio stations having contracts with a network such as the contracts CBS had with its affiliates. CBS alleged that its affiliates had cancelled or were threatening to cancel contracts with it as a result of the regulations. The Court held that "[tihe Commission's contention that the regulations are no more reviewable than a press release is hardly reconcilable with

H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
'llThe Administrative Procedure Act does provide for notice of proposed rulemaking
proceedings in the Federal Register and an opportunity for interested persons to participate.
5 U.S.C. § 553. However, this requirement has been held not to apply to revenue rulings
on the basis that such rulings are "interpretive" rather than substantive. 506 F.2d at 1290.
The Supreme Court did not disturb this determination by the court of appeals in its decision
in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights.
192 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
190
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its own recognition that the regulations afford legal basis for cancellation of
193
the license of a station if it renews its contract with the appellant.'
Cases under the APA indicate that an agency, in nonadjudicatory
action, may not avoid judicial review through the assertion that a determination having serious impact on interested parties is not final."" In Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith,' a ruling of the Comptroller
of the Currency that customer bank communication terminals were not
"branch" banks within the meaning of the National Banking Act, 9" and
hence subject to the Act's limitations on branch banking, was held to be
sufficiently final to permit judicial review. The court, citing Abbott Laboratories, held that "an agency's interpretation of its governing statute, with
the expectation that regulated parties will conform to and rely upon this
interpretation, is final agency action fit for judicial review.""'
From these decisions it appears that if the IRS's interpretation of the
tax laws results in injury to an individual or entity such interpretation should
be subject to challenge under the APA assuming that standing requirements have been met. This is true unless such interpretation is committed to
agency discretion under the APA.
The Administrative Procedure Act contains limitations on the scope of
judicial review available thereunder.' The legislative history of the APA
indicates that these limitations were intended to be construed narrowly. 1 "
As noted above, the government argued vigorously in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights that Congress has chosen not to give the federal courts general authority to review IRS policy decisions.
It is clear that to a degree Congress did intend to limit judicial review
of IRS action. Notwithstanding the judicial review provision of the APA,
Id. at 422.
194See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
193

where the court held that an order of the EPA refusing to suspend federal registration of
the pesticide DDT on the ground that there was no "imminent hazard" was sufficiently final
to warrant judicial review.
295 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied, sub nom. Bloom v. Independent Bankers
Ass'n of America, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
'98 12 U.S.C. §§ I to 215 (1970).
197 534 F.2d at 929.

198 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1) & (2) (1970), provide that judicial review shall be available except to the extent that "statutes preclude judicial review" or "agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law."
199 S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1946):

"Very rarely do statutes withhold

judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its
own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified." Accord, 390 U.S. 150 (1950).
But see Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1955); Motah v. United States, 402

F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968).
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the restrictions on judicial action embodied in the Anti-Injunction Act and
the Declaratory Judgment Act exception retain their validity. Whether these
two provisions were intended to be applicable to IRS actions other than tax
assessment and collection shall be discussed herein.
The legislative history of the APA indicates that the proper inquiry in
determining reviewability vel non is not to look for special authorization
for judicial review, but rather to look for specific exclusion of the federal
courts from jurisdiction.
The government brief in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights bases the
existence of a general exclusion of the federal courts from jurisdiction in
federal tax matters upon essentially two things: the long standing power of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to issue rules and regulations pertaining to tax matters and the creation of the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation as a tax oversight committee.
There may be some validity to the contention that Congress intended
that the rulemaking powers of the Commissioner not be subject to judicial
review. Some justification for such a position may be found in the provisions
of the Revenue Bill of 1938200 authorizing the Commissioner to make closing

agreements as to transactions not yet completed. Some language in the scant
legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress intended that the
Commissioner exercise considerable discretion in making closing agreements." 1 The language of the House committee report lends some credence
to the contention of the government that the IRS has been given a unique
authority over the administration of the tax laws. The legislative history
reveals no explicit intention, however, to exclude judicial review of the
closing agreement or rulings process.
Furthermore, the contention in the government brief in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, that the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation" 2 was intended to ensure that the Commissioner could administer the
200 §§ 801, 802, 52 Stat. 573 (Codified at I.R.C. § 7121(a), (b)). This authorized the Commissioner to give rulings and advice as to prospective as well as consummated transactions.
For the most part the Service refused to issue rulings as to prospective transactions, a policy
announced in Mim. 4963, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 459, until 1953 when the Service began to
issue rulings on proposed transactions. Rev. Rul. 10, 1963-1 CuM. BuLL. 488.
201 H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 67 (1938) notes:
Closing agreements will also be possible concerning transactions not yet consummated
at the time of the agreement. The authority given to the Commissioner under this
section is discretionary. Since closing agreements of this type will constitute a new
method of settling controversies, it is contemplated that the Commissioner will exercise
his discretionary power only where such exercise is in the interests of a wide administration of the revenue system.
202 This committee was created by the Revenue Act of 1938, Ch. 27, § 1203, 44 Stat. 127
(now I.R.C. §§ 8001, 8002, 8021, 8022).
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assessment and collection of taxes free from fear of judicial review, is not
supported. There is no mention of such an intent in the purpose clause of
the act creating the committee." 3
The Joint Committee does indeed have authority to investigate the
administration of the tax laws not only generally,2 °" but also on a case by
case basis.2 0 The case by case participation of the Committee occurs primarily in cases of very large refunds or credits. If allegations of illegality
against the IRS by plaintiffs who cannot secure judicial relief in regular tax
proceedings involve important issues, such review powers of the Committee
might be a sufficient substitute for judicial relief. Many nontaxpayer suits
do not seek to disgorge large sums from the Treasury or to bring about tax
policy reform. Such actions often seek relief against actions of third parties,
harmful to the plaintiff, that have been somehow illegally fostered by the
IRS. It would seem more appropriate to permit the injured party to seek
his own redress since the allegedly illegal action may cause no harm at all
to the government. Indeed, an important rationale of the standing limitation
on federal jurisdiction is that the party directly aggrieved is best suited to
seek his own relief.
It is important to note that passage of the APA followed both the creation of the Joint Committee and the authorization of the Commissioner to
enter into closing agreements as to transactions not yet consummated. The
legislative history of the APA reveals no intention on the part of Congress
to provide a general exemption from judicial review, and its consideration
of IRS functions in particular reveals that Congress intended that agency
action should be exempted from Section 10 only to the extent it is reviewable
de novo in the Tax Court or in the district courts. Review by the Joint Committee could not be at the instance of the party aggrieved. Contrary to the
government's contention in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights there is no
general exemption of the IRS from Section 10 of the APA.
It is clear from the legislative reports accompanying the APA that
Congress intended to exempt no particular agency from judicial review
under Section 10. Only particular functions of some agencies were ex20 H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1925). The House Ways and Means Com-

mittee stated:
It shall be the duty of the committee to investigate and report upon the operation, effects and administration of the Federal system of income and other internal revenue
taxes and upon any proposals or measures which in the judgment of the commission
may be employed to simplify or improve the operation or administration of such systems of taxes and to make and report upon such other investigations in respect of such
system of taxes as the commission may deem necessary.
204 L.RC. S 8022.
205 .R.C. § 6405.
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empted.2 °1 It is also clear that Congress did intend to exempt some IRS
action from judicial review under Section 10 but that this limitation applied
only to matters which may be tried de novo in the Tax Court or the United
States district courts.20 7
It is at least arguable that Congress considered excluding the IRS closing agreements function, which developed into the rulings program,"0 ' from
the APA and rejected such a proposal since the following provision appeared
in a House version of the Act:
Sec. 404. Judicial review by an agency tribunal may be had in the
manner and to the same extent as final orders or other determinations
of that agency tribunal; except that this title shall not be deemed to
modify existing provisions of law applicable to closing agreements
concerning internal-revenue--tax matters.0 '
No such language was included in the final version of the APA.
On balance, the ambiguous language in the legislative histories of the
closing agreements provision of the Revenue Act of 1938 and the provision
of the Revenue Act of 1926 creating the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation is probably not of sufficient weight to create an exception
to the overriding intent of Congress to provide for review of most federal
agency action. At the time of the enactment of the APA, the courts had
been purposely excluded from all but limited review of the assessment and
collection of taxes. That Congress took cognizance of this exclusion in enacting the APA, and did not extend the restrictions on judicial review to
other IRS functions, is convincing evidence that Congress never intended to
provide a unique insulation from judicial review for the IRS. 1 Whether or
not the rulings function may realistically be regarded as part of the tax
assessment and collection functions of the IRS in all cases is a matter that
will be discussed in the next section.
206 In S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. 5 (1946) the Senate Judiciary Committee
noted:
[lit has been the undeviating policy [of the committee] to deal with types of functions
as such and in no case with administrative agencies by name. Thus certain war and
defense functions are exempted, but not the War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other functions. Manifestly, it would be folly to assume to distinguish between "good" agencies and others, and no such distinction is made in the
bill. The legitimate needs of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, have
been fully considered but it has not been placed in a favored position by exemption
from the bill.
-07 Id. at 28. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in considering agency functions exempted from
judicial review, specifically used tax assessments as an example.
208 Supra note 201.
209 H.R. REP. No. 184, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
210 Brief for government, 506 F.2d 1278.
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THE SCOPE OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AND THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT EXCEPTION

In order to sustain as wide a scope as possible for the Anti-Injunction
Act, the government attributed to Congress in Eastern Kentucky Welfare

Rights, an intent to preclude judicial interference with the expertise of the
Commissioner in Internal Revenue matters."' It is argued that from this
intent flows a prohibition which is so all encompassing that it includes any
judicial review of a revenue ruling, even when such review will have no effect
on or even increase tax revenues. In truth, there is no way to determine
Congress' intent in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act, for the Act has no
legislative history. 12

It has been contended that it is likely that Congress did not even consider application of the Anti-Injunction Act to actions for injunctive or declaratory relief by persons or entities whose tax liability is not at issue and
which do not threaten interference with collection of tax revenues.213 The

House Ways and Means Committee in considering the Tax Reform Act of
1976, specifically refused to criticize or endorse such actions. "'
Realistically, all that can be done in attempting to determine whether
Congress intended as wide a scope for the Anti-Injunction Act as the government urges in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights is to examine the provision
in context with other statutes and with prior and subsequent court decisions.

The Anti-Injunction Act was enacted as an amendment to a provision of the
Revenue Act of 1866 which limits the right to sue for recovery of taxes paid

at 35-39.
For an excellent discussion of attempts to locate a legislative history of the Anti-Injunction
Act, see Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory
Prohibition, 49 HAuv. L. REv. 109, n.9 (1935).
213 See 1T&T v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Del. 1975).
214 H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 284, n.6 (1976). The Committee noted:
The Supreme Court has implicitly held that under certain circumstances suits can be
brought by third parties to restrain the Internal Revenue Service from treating an organization as being exempt. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), affirming Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1971), a decision by a special three judge district court.
This bill constitutes neither an implied endorsement nor an implied criticism of such
"third party" suits. However, your committee does intend that, with respect to accepting
amicus curiae briefs and permitting appearances by third parties in declaratory judgment
suits under this bill, the courts should be as generous as they can be, in light of the
expeditious decisions in those cases and the general state of the courts' calendars.
This referred specifically to a provision providing for declaratory judgments for the status
of § 501(c)(3) organizations. Id. n.11.
211 Id.
212

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 6
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[o.1: 12:1I
[V/ol.

until after an appeal was made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
The 1866 provision prevented an action to recover the tax actually paid
before a claim was made to the Commissioner but it did not eliminate actions
for injunctive relief before the tax was collected or assessed. 1 The failure

of the 1866 Act to prescribe injunctive relief was a consequential omission
since at least one federal circuit court had construed the Revenue Act of
1864211 as preserving an 1833 statute 18 which provided broad federal court
jurisdiction to grant remedies to aggrieved taxpayers. In Cutting v. Gilbert "
a group of bankers and brokers sought to enjoin a tax under Section 99 of
the Revenue Act of 1864. 1 The court denied relief on the basis that a
determinate number of taxpayers could not bring an action on behalf of
other taxpayers similarly situated. The court noted, however:

I do not doubt the jurisdiction or power of the courts to interfere, and
prevent the threatened imposition of the tax, if it is illegal. The second
section of the act of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. 632), known as the "Force
Act," confers jurisdiction in express terms, and has been applied to the

Act of 1864, by its fiftieth section. And jurisdiction had previously, and
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 152 (now I.R.C. § 6532(a)). This ancestor
of the present section limiting refund suits read as follows:
[N]o suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have
been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made
to the commissioner of internal revenue according to the provisions of the law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury established in pursuance
thereof, and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, unless such a suit shall
be brought within six months from the time of said decision, or from the time this
act takes effect: Provided, that if such decision shall be delayed more than six months
from the date of such appeal, then said suit may be brought at any time within twelve
months from the date of such appeal.
216 Thus, the text of the Anti-Injunction Act read simply: 'That section nineteen is hereby
amended by adding the following thereto: 'And no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court.'" Act of March 2, 1867,
ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475 (now I.R.C. § 7421(a)). This provision was added to the 1867
Act by Sen. Fessenden of Maine who was responsible for the wording of § 19 of the 1866
Act. See Note supra note 212; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3382 (1866).
217 Ch. 173, 13 Stat. 241.
218 The statute was the so-called "Force Act" of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632. Section
50 of the 1864 Act did refer to the 1833 Act. Section 2 of the Force Act provided: "ghe
jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States shall extend to all cases, in law or
equity, arising under the revenue laws of the United States, for which provisions are not
215

already made by law .

.

.

."

The Supreme Court held in Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 72

U.S. (5 Wall.) 541 (1866), that § 67 of the Revenue Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 172, deprived
the federal courts of jurisdiction in suits involving the internal revenue acts where diversity
of citizenship was lacking between the plaintiff and the defendant revenue official. As a result
of this decision the only actions for injunction that could be maintained concerning federal
taxes were those against customs officials and those against internal revenue officials where
diversity existed. The Force Act was repealed as obsolete by the Act of March 3, 1933, ch.
202, 47 Stat. 1428.
219 6 F. Cas. 1079 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865).
220
Supra note 217.
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has since been upheld and exercised upon general principles of equity
jurisprudence." '
In light of the availability of injunctive relief to plaintiffs contesting
assessment and collection of federal taxes prior to 1867, the attempt to
limit taxpayers in the 1866 Act must be seen as incomplete. The Anti-Injunction Act, in that context, appears not as a broad statement of congressional intent to exclude the federal courts from reviewing the functions of
the IRS but as an attempt to plug a leak in the 1866 legislation. 2
The early decisions of district courts construing the Anti-Injunction Act
clearly indicate its very particular and limited purpose. In Howland v.
Soule,2 ' the court, holding that an action for injunctive relief against collection of a federal tax by distraint was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act
reasoned:
A person not pleased with a tax will readily conclude that it is illegal
or erroneous, and a suit for injunction follows. His neighbor soon
catches the infection, and the result would be that the wheels of government would be stopped by injunction and revenue would cease to flow
into the treasury ....The statute prohibits all suits to enjoin the collection of a tax, and leaves the person who considers himself aggrieved
by the collection thereof to the ordinary and usual remedy-an action
at law to recover back the amount paid.2 '
2 5 the court construed
Likewise, in Delaware Railroad Co. v. Prettyman,"
the
Anti-Injunction Act simply as withdrawing the power of injunctive relief
against tax assessments and collections, "which it [was] believed on good
legal authority rested in the power of the courts ....,22

6 F. Cas. 1080. See also Magee v. Denton, 16 F. Cas. 382 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863)
where an action to enjoin collection of tax under the Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12
Stat. 433 was unsuccessful not because jurisdiction was lacking but because the plaintiff
failed to avail himself of the steps required to invoke the legal remedy of mandamus.
22
21t is easier to view the 1866 and 1867 legislation restricting taxpayer remedies simply
as an attempt to balance relief to the taxpayer with the government's need for prompt
collection of revenues in light of Congress' creation of the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900 (now I.R.C. § 7441). This provided a
forum where a taxpayer could litigate the validity of the tax before paying it. That the
Board was intended as a means of restoring the balance between the needs of government
and the taxpayer is indicated by the following comment by Rep. Gore during hearings on
the legislation:
mhe taxpayer . . .is absolutely at the mercy of the Commissioner unless he is
wealthy and can go to court. Every man who is unjustly assessed to an amount of
$3,000 or less, can not afford to go into the Federal Court and fight it out. He can
better afford to pay it, however unjust it may be.
REvENUE REviSION OF 1924: HEARINGS OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMIrrTEE OF THE
HousE OF REPRESENTATiVES, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 459-60 (1924).
228 12 F. Cas. 743 (C.C.D.Cal. 1868).
224 1d. at 744.
225 7 F. Cas. 408 (C.C.D.Del. 1872).
226 Id. at 409. See also Kissinger v. Bean, 14 F. Cas. 689 (C.C.E.D.Wis. 1875).
221
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The decision of the Supreme Court in the State Railroad Tax Cases
states broadly the legislative rationale behind the Anti-Injunction Act. 2 An
analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act in context with other enactments and the
early decisions construing it leads to two conclusions. The first is that the
Anti-Injunction Act is inseparable from the notion of preventing interference
with the actual assessment and collection of revenues. There is no basis for
attributing any other tax administration purpose to Congress. Therefore, if
an administrative function of the IRS does not actually involve the assessment and collection of taxes, then the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable.
The second observation that must be made is that an essential indicium
of an assessment or collection function is that it be reviewable in a manner
contemplated by Congress. As clearly as Congress intended to limit taxpayer remedies in the 1866 and 1867 Revenue Acts, it also intended to
provide controlled alternatives for redress. If Congress has not provided a
specific remedy for an individual or entity to challenge a particular action
of the IRS, then it has not ousted the federal courts from jurisdiction.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University and
"Americans United" Inc. are consistent with these two observations. In both
cases, while the possibility of tax liability on the part of the plaintiffs, and
hence actual interference with collection of revenues was questionable,
judicial relief with respect to the plaintiffs would have unquestionably affected
the tax liability of the donors to the formerly tax-exempt organizations in
both cases. Assuming that both organizations had donors willing to challenge
the disallowance of a deduction of a contribution to the plaintiffs, or that
the organizations would themselves have unemployment tax liability, judicial
intervention would be improper because remedies in the Tax Court or a
refund suit could have been pursued. Probably it was in recognition that the
availability of prescribed forms of relief was so attenuated for both these
plaintiffs that Congress provided a special form of declaratory relief in the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.228 This relief is available regardless of the obvious
effects on the assessment and collection of taxes on the donors to purported
tax-exempt organizations.
92 U.S. 575 (1875). The court stated the rationale of Congress in enacting the AntiInjunction Act as follows:
[Ilt shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if the courts of justice could,
in any case, interfere with the process of collecting the taxes on which the government
depends for its continued existence. It is a wise policy. It is founded in the simple
philosophy derived from the experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has to be
enforced by summary and stringent means against a reluctant and often adverse
227

sentiment: and to do this successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice.
92 U.S. at 613. See also Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193 (1883).
22 8 Supra note 11.
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Lower federal court decisions have tended to hold the Anti-Injunction
Act inapplicable in cases involving plaintiffs challenging IRS action not
directly involving their own taxes and where the relief requested could not
plausibly result in a diminution of tax revenues. The prohibitions of the
Anti-Injunction Act have remained intact, however, in those cases where the
plaintiffs' suits would threaten to diminish federal revenues. Three recent
cases have demonstrated the courts' application of the Anti-Injunction Act,
Cattle Feeders Tax Committee v. Shultz,2 2 Investors Syndicate of America
v. Simon,2 3 and Educo, Inc. v. Alexander."" In Cattle Feeders Tax Committee the plaintiffs, unincorporated associations, sought injunctive relief
against Revenue Ruling 73-530,22 which limited the ability of farmers on
the cash basis method of accounting to deduct the cost of feed in tax years
other than in the year the feed was actually consumed. The plaintiffs alleged
that the ruling discouraged investment in the cattle business, thereby destroying the business of their members and causing irreparable injury. The court
held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the strict requirements for injunctive
relief embodied in the Williams Packing and Navigation Co. decision2 33 and
emphasized the availability of an alternative remedy to litigate the issues
raised by the plaintiffs' suit since "any investor ...could litigate the validity
of the ruling in a suit for refund or in the Tax Court."2 '
In Investors Syndicate of America, the plaintiff was an investment company seeking injunctive relief against certain Treasury regulations that required holders of face amount certificates to report ratable portions of interest to be received at payout in the years before payout." 5 The plaintiff
alleged that the promulgation of these regulations made these certificates
unmarketable. The Court recognized that since any taxes on an interest in
such certificates were imposed on the purchasers and not the sellers, the
plaintiff would have no forum to contest the validity of the regulations.286
Citing Cattle Feeders Tax Committee, however, the court held that the
plaintiff's suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act because the plaintiff
-9 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
407 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1975).

230

231

232

557 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1977).
Because of the filing of the suit in Cattle Feeders Tax Committee the IRS announced

in TIR-1266, P-H 1973 FED. TAxEs
55,446 (Dec. 12, 1973), that it would delay publication of Rev. Rul. 73-530. The Service announced it would maintain the ruling's interpretation but the ruling was never published.
233 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
234 504
235

F.2d at 466.

Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-1(c)(3) and § 1.1232-3A(f)(1)
Cum.BULL. 345).
236 407 F. Supp. at 85.
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had failed to meet its burden of showing that under no circumstances could
the government ultimately prevail.
In Educo, Inc., the plaintiff was a corporation engaged in designing,
administering and implementing educational benefit plans for corporate employees. In Revenue Ruling 75-448, 23, the IRS announced that employer
contributions to such plans for their employees would be deductible as a
business expense " 8 only when included in the gross income of the employees
for whose benefit such contributions were made. As in Cattle Feeders Tax
Committee and Investors Syndicate, the IRS action did not affect the tax
liability of the plaintiff in Educo, Inc. The plaintiff contended that as a result
of the ruling some of its clients had threatened to cancel or had actually
cancelled existing plans. The plaintiff contended that it only wished to maintain its business, but it was clear that an injunction against the challenged
ruling would result in a reduction in taxes for numerous taxpayers. The
court noted that "Americans United" Inc. and Bob Jones University applied
to this situation and held that the action was barred under the Anti-Injunction
239
Act.
It is clear in Cattle Feeders Tax Committee, Investors Syndicate and
Educo, Inc. that IRS action may have a devastating effect on businesses who
are then denied any access to judicial review of such action. When injunctive
relief against such action threatens interference with tax collections of any
individual or entity, the congressional purpose in enacting the Anti-Injunction
Act is best served by prohibiting such injunctive relief. Careful selection of
plaintiffs could render the Anti-Injunction Act meaningless. Perhaps it is
sensible to conclude that in instances where tax collections would be affected,
and where deferring a remedy until after payment creates hardship, Congress
will act to remedy such hardship.
In recent years, several district courts have granted injunctive relief
against IRS action where the plaintiffs tax liability was not at issue. In all
but two cases, injunctive relief could not plausibly have caused a diminution
in federal revenues. In one very recent and unsettling case, Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal,"' the relief granted can only be seen as reducing
federal revenues. Why this decision is probably incorrect shall be discussed
1975-2 CUM. BULL. 55.
See I.R.C. § 162.
239 557 F.2d at 620.
24040 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5558 (D.D.C. July 12, 1977) (government motion to dismiss reversed); 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5922 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1977) (government
motion to dismiss denied); 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-6151 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 1977)
(judgment for plaintiff).
237

238
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herein. All of these cases can legitimately be regarded as third party or nontaxpayer suits, except perhaps for Investment Annuity, Inc.
The first of these decisions, Green v. Kennedy, 24 1 involved an action in
which black taxpayers sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from
granting tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated
against blacks in admissions. The court granted a preliminary injunction
upon a finding that tax benefits by the IRS to segregated schools and their
donors resulted in substantial and significant support to a pattern of segregated schools. 4 2 It does not appear that the Court even considered the Anti-

Injunction Act. After the court entered its preliminary injunction, the IRS
determined that it could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status to
schools that practice racial discrimination. In a subsequent opinion arising
out of the same controversy, the court in Green v. Connally4 8 granted a
declaration that the Internal Revenue Code requires the denial and elimination of federal tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools and
of deductions for their contributors. This relief was granted upon the conclusion that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on charitable
exemptions and deductions could not be construed to frustrate federal policy
by supporting schools operating on a discriminatory basis.2 '
Neither the Anti-Injunction Act nor the Declaratory Judgment Act
exception was considered by the court in either decision. 4 While the court
in Connally reviewed a policy determination by the IRS outside of the context of a refund suit, such review does not seem to run afoul of the purpose
of Congress in limiting judicial review when assessment or collection of taxes
are involved. The action of the court, in denying segregated Mississippi
schools tax-exempt status and deductions to their contributors, could plausibly be seen as increasing tax revenues or having no effect upon them at all.
It is probably significant, however, that the IRS had changed its position
on the tax exemptions involved in Connally during the pendency of the suit.
The lack of a truly adversary proceeding and the failure of the court to consider the Anti-Injunction Act issue should probably limit the weight given
Connally as precedent in the nontaxpayer suit context.
241 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed, sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398

U.S. 956 (1970). Later proceedings were reported in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd, sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
242309 F. Supp. at 1134.
24 330 F. Supp. at 1150.
-"Id.at 1164.
245The Anti-Injunction Act would not be inapplicable because the plaintiff's claim involved constitutional issues. See United States v. Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974).
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In a similar action, McGlotten v. Connally," ' the court considered the
applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act
exception. In McGlotten the plaintiff, a black American who alleged that
he was refused membership in an Elks lodge because of his race, sought to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from granting federal tax benefits to
fraternal and nonprofit organizations which exclude nonwhites from membership. The plaintiff alleged that to the extent that various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code authorized benefits to such organizations, the sections
were unconstitutional. Alternatively the plaintiff alleged that the Internal
Revenue Code did not authorize such benefits. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the action was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act exception:
Plaintiff's action has nothing to do with the collection or assessment of
taxes. He does not seek to limit the amount of his own tax, nor does
he seek to limit the amount of revenue collectible by the United States.
The preferred course of raising his objections in a suit for refund is
not available. In this situation we cannot read the statute to bar the
present suit.2 "
The court held that permitting deductibility of contributions to fraternal
organizations discriminating against racial minorities and permitting a tax
exemption for the organizations themselves for passive investment income
as well as member generated funds2 ' were a form of subsidy by the government within the Civil Rights Act."" The court fashioned an appropriate
decree to prevent the Commissioner from according favorable tax treatment
to such organizations.
In McGlotten, the plaintiff's action posed no threat to federal revenues.
Assuming that Congress, in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act, intended to
defer taxpayer remedies only where there is an effect on federal revenues,
it is clear that the court violated no congressional mandate by proceeding
to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim. Since Congress created alternative remedies
for taxpayers in cases where it wished to protect tax revenues by deferring
judicial review, no deferral of judicial review is intended where there is no
threat to tax revenues.
This principle was developed further in Tax Analysts and Advocates v.
Schultz."' In that case the plaintiffs, who included a nonprofit corporation
2" 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
247

Id. at 453-54.

2" See I.R.C. § 501(c) (8).
24942

U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970).

2150376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
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interested in "tax reform" and one of its members, sought, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory relief against Revenue Ruling 72-355 . 51 That ruling
permitted, under certain conditions, multiple gifts of $3,000 to different
campaign committees of the same candidate for political office to be treated
as gifts not to the same candidate. The ruling had the effect of permitting
multiple exclusions for gifts to the same candidate from the gift tax provision
of the Internal Revenue Code.252 The individual plaintiff, a taxpayer, voter
and small contributor to political campaigns, alleged that the effect of this
ruling was to diminish his ability to affect the electoral process and to increase the influence of large contributors. The court held that this was sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff.25
The court, in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment,
distinguished Bob Jones University and "Americans United" Inc. on the
basis that the plaintiffs in Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz did not
seek, unlike the plaintiffs in Bob Jones University and "Americans United"
Inc., to restrain the enforcement of any tax. The court concluded that "Tax
Analysts seeks to force the IRS to collect a tax which is due, but which has
been allegedly avoided by an illegal Revenue Ruling .... [A]n action to force
the collection of [a] tax is clearly outside the scope of both the language and
intent of § 7421 (a). '"5 ' The court also noted that the plaintiffs were not
able to litigate their claims in a refund suit, unlike the plaintiffs in cases relied
upon by the government as authority. 5
Thus, after the decision of the district court in Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz, it appeared that there might be an exception to the AntiInjunction Act: 1) where the plaintiff's own tax liability is not in issue and
no remedy in the Tax Court or a refund suit is available to him and 2)

1972-2 CuM. BULL. 532.
I.R.C. § 2503(b).
Supra note 178.
254 376 F. Supp. at 893-94. That the court narrowly construed the congressional intent in
enacting the Anti-Injunction Act is revealed in the following language dealing with sovereign
immunity and reviewability under the APA:
Defendants contend that full discretion over administration of the Internal Revenue
Code has been entrusted to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and therefore there is not consent to the suit and it must be dis251
252
25
3

missed .

. .

. The Court concludes that no statutory provision confers the absolute and

unfettered discretion with which the defendants would have this court endow the
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service in connection with the administration and interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
376 F. Supp. at 895.
255 Id. at 894.
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where the plaintiff does not seek in any way a diminution of tax revenues
from any source."5 6
Two decisions in the district courts since Tax Analysts and Advocates
v. Schultz appear to stretch the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act even
to situations where there may be some revenue effect but where there is no
means of judicial review available to the plaintiff in the Tax Court or a refund
suit. These two decisions, National Restaurant Association v. Simon,2 and
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal,"8 to the extent they permit injunctive relief that might result in decreased tax collections from taxpayers other
than the plaintiffs, are inconsistent with Bob Jones University, "Americans
United" Inc., and probably the intent of Congress in enacting the AntiInjunction Act.
In National RestaurantAssociation the plaintiffs challenged the legality
of Revenue Ruling 75-400,111 which requires restaurant owners to keep records of credit card tips paid by them to employees. The plaintiffs contended
that this requirement was in conflict with other sections of the Internal Revenue Code and that the IRS had failed to follow the appropriate rulemaking
procedures of the APA. 6 0 The court found that the injunction sought by the
plaintiffs would have "the effect of hampering the proper assessment and
collection of taxes rightfully due, within the meaning of the statute.""'
Nevertheless, the court held Section 7421 inapplicable because the
aggrieved party had no access to judicial review. The government suggested
that the aggrieved restaurant owners could refuse to file the required statements, pay the fines occasioned thereby,"'2 and then bring suit for a refund
of the fines paid. Concerning this "remedy" the court noted:
This is obviously not the "refund" action contemplated by the Act. It
puts the plaintiffs in the untenable position of either complying, with
256 The decision in Common Cause v. Shultz, 73-2 U.S. TAx CAS.

9592 (D.D.C. Aug. 1,
1973) is consistent with these two principles. In that case the plaintiffs, John Gardner and
Common Cause as citizens, voters and contributors to and participants in campaigns, sought
an injunction of Temporary Regulation § 12.6, T.D. 7227, 37 Fed. Reg. 27621 (1972), limiting the time for designation of $1.00 to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund to the
time of the filing of one's return. The Court held that this regulation was in excess of the
Commissioner's authority. It is difficult to imagine that there would be any revenue effect
as a result of this action or that plaintiffs had alternative avenues in the form of a Tax Court
proceeding or a refund suit.
257 411 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C. 1976).
258 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5558 (D.D.C. July 12, 1977).
259

1975-2 Cum. BULL. 464.

260As

to the plaintiffs contention that rulemaking procedures of the APA had not been
followed, the court determined that the rules were "interpretative" and thus did not require
the formalities of 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1970).
261 411 F. Supp. at 995.
;62 I.R.C. § 6652,
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no judicial review, or of defying the government's interpretation of their
legal obligations under the code, of being in essence a lawbreaker ....
This is money not due the government in taxes, but rather is an extra
sum the plaintiffs would apparently be required to risk merely to test
the validity of a reporting and information requirement .... The Court
therefore concludes, in light of these considerations, and the obvious
constitutional problems they may raise, that the Anti-Injunction Act
was not intended to, and does not apply in such a situation."'3
Perhaps the only relaxation of the rigors of the Anti-Injunction Act
contained in National Restaurant Association is that it will not be applicable where the only "tax" upon which a would-be plaintiff may base his
refund litigation is a fine. There is some support for the notion that one need
not incur criminal liability in order to challenge a tax."8 At any rate, no
injunction was granted in National Restaurant Association because the court
held that the ruling itself was valid.
In Investment Annuity, Inc. the district court for the District of Columbia, in its first two of three decisions involved in the action, 8 fashioned a
novel exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In that case the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief against Revenue Ruling 77-85.168 In this ruling the IRS
determined that investment annuities issued henceforth would no longer
enjoy favorable tax treatment accorded conventional segregated asset accounts under the Code. 7 The ruling "grandfathered" existing investment
annuity contracts, thereby continuing their favorable treatment and restricting the avenues by which the ruling could be challenged.
The plaintiff, a seller of such annuities, stopped selling them in anticipation of the ruling and as a result of action by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Investment Commissioner of Pennsylvania. The court,
in an initial consideration of the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejected the
notion that the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act exception barred the plaintiff's action. The court read the decision of the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University as limited only to situations where
the agency action challenged may at some point be subject to judicial re268
view.
288411 F. Supp. at 996.
264 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
285 40 Am. Fed Tax R. 2d 77-5558; 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5923.
248

1977-15 I.R.B. 7.

I.R.C. § 801(g) (1) (B). The effect of the ruling was that income was taxed to the holder
of the annuity when added to the holder's separate account rather than, as previously, to
the insurance company which would receive more favorable rate under § 804(c).
287

28s

40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-5560.
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The court considered that under the facts of the case, the challenged
action of the IRS could not be reviewed in a Tax Court proceeding or refund
suit. This was because the ruling would actually lower the taxes of Investment Annuity and because present annuity holders were not affected by the
ruling. The court determined, however, that the plaintiff had not exhausted
every conceivable avenue of obtaining judicial review. " 9 The court reserved
a decision on the defendant's motion to dismiss until the plaintiff had an
opportunity to attempt to obtain permission from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Pennsylvania Investment Commissioner to sell a
new investment annuity contract or to accept a new contribution under an
existing contract in order to set the stage for a friendly third party refund
suit or Tax Court proceeding.
When the court was later informed by the plaintiff that the SEC and
the Pennsylvania Investment Commissioner had denied the plaintiff's request,
it determined that the plaintiff could not stage a third-party suit without
flouting the rulings of both agencies. The court therefore permitted the
plaintiff's suit to proceed notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Like the plaintiffs in National Restaurant Association, the plaintiff was
arguably in a position where it would have to become a lawbreaker in order
to challenge IRS action. The holding of Investment Annuity Inc., however,
appears broader than that of National Restaurant Association. The court
predicated its exception to the Anti-Injunction Act on the plaintiff's lack
of any access at all to judicial review. In a later order"' the court held the
challenged revenue ruling invalid and granted the plaintiff full declaratory
relief.
The decisions in National Restaurant Association and Investment Annuity, Inc. are probably incorrect to the extent that they permit injunctive
relief against IRS action even though such injunctive relief results in a diminution of tax liability. In several instances where hardship has been caused
by deferring judicial review of IRS action, Congress has attempted to solve
the problems this action creates by enlarging the judicial remedies available.
This supports the notion that where an individual feels he has an inadequate
The Investment Annuity, Inc. court considered the decision in 1T&T v. Alexander, 396
F. Supp. 1150 (D. Del. 1975), discussed supra note 75, in which IT&T unsuccessfully sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against revocation of letter rulings that its merger with
the Hartford Fire Insurance Co. was a tax free reorganization. Shortly after the revocation,
the IRS had asserted deficiencies against a large number of shareholders. The court noted
that if IT&T were denied a right to participate as interested nonparty or amicus curiae in
the Tax Court or if it were denied intervention in the district court refund litigation, the
court might reconsider its dismissal of IT&T's action on the basis of the Anti-Injunction Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 368 F. Supp. at 1168.
270 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 6160.
269
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judicial remedy, and injunctive relief would serve to lower the taxes of some
third party, his plea should be directed to Congress and not to the courts.2"
On the other hand, there is no indication whatsoever that Congress in
enacting the Anti-Injunction Act intended to insulate the IRS or to give it
extraordinary discretion not subject to judicial review. If a plaintiff's action
does not threaten a diminution in federal tax revenues and the plaintiff meets
standing requirements and the requirements of the APA for judicial review,
his action should not be barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, perhaps more than the Anti-Injunction
Act, supports the government's contention that Congress intended to preclude
judicial review of IRS actions.
In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights it was argued that the provision
in the Declaratory Judgment Act," 2 worded "except with respect to Federal
Taxes," was intended to preclude resort to the declaratory judgment remedy
in any case involving federal taxes. The exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act is not expressly limited to assessment and collection. The legislative
history of the exception is ambiguous as to whether the provision was aimed

Congress might well consider a definitive resolution of the conflict between the government's need for efficient collection of revenues without undue judicial interference and the
need for a judicial remedy of individuals or entities who are genuinely aggrieved by IRS
action, but who may not challenge such action in the Tax Court or a refund suit. One such
resolution might be to permit a plaintiff who is aggrieved by IRS action within the meaning
of the APA, and who has no other judicial remedy available, to petition the Tax Court for
a declaratory judgment as to the legality of the IRS action. The Tax Court now is able to
give declaratory judgments concerning qualification for special tax treatment of retirement
plans, see I.R.C. § 7476, and has concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts to give
declaratory judgments pertaining to the status and classification of organizations under §
501(c)(3). See I.R.C. § 7428.
Obviously the Tax Court would have to grapple with difficult questions of standing and
justiciability in a manner similar to the other federal courts. The Tax Court's lack of equity
jurisdiction would prevent it from direct interference with the tax assessment and collection
process.
It might be argued that establishing such a mechanism might cause the Tax Court to be
flooded with suits by politically motivated individuals similar to suits which challenged the
legality of the Vietnam War, see, e.g., Pietsch v. President, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971), or certain welfare programs, see, e.g., Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 442 (1923). Such suits would probably be filed in the federal district
courts anyway and the Tax Court would not proceed far with them if it were determined
in threshold inquiry that standing or justiciability is lacking.
Although this remedy might be made available to plaintiffs regardless of the practical
revenue effect of Tax Court declaratory judgments, the IRS would benefit in that it would
litigate such controversies in a unified forum, the Tax Court, rather than in district courts
throughout the United States, as is now the case.
272 Supra note 3.
271
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solely at actions for declaratory judgment that actually interfered with assessment and collection of taxes 7 3 or to IRS actions in general.
Examining the exception in the context of its enactment sheds some
light on the problem Congress was attempting to remedy and perhaps the
intent of Congress. The passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934
offered taxpayers a potential means of obtaining expeditious review of assessment and collection of federal taxes. At least one court held that an action
for declaratory judgment against a federal tax was maintainable in those cases
where injunctive relief was not available. In Penn v. Glenn,2 14 an action to
have a tobacco tax declared unconstitutional, the court held that "[als applied to tax statutes, this proceeding [under the Declaratory Judgment Act]
is merely a convenient means of settling the law before payment of the
tax, or after payment of the tax and before the institution of a suit for refund."2 5' Such a construction would have rendered the Anti-Injunction Act
meaningless. The subsequent enactment of the exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act resulted in the dismissal of many attempts to interfere with
assessment and collection of federal taxes. 2
The enactment of the exception, however, did not stop attempts by
taxpayers to avail themselves of the declaratory judgment remedy in tax
controversies. The federal courts have consistently rejected attempts by taxpayers to litigate in declaratory judgment actions concerning their own
taxes, 7 7 or the tax liability of another taxpayer. 7 8 Many of these cases have
taken the broad view that the declaratory judgment is unavailable in cases
278 This is demonstrated by somewhat conflicting statements in different parts of the legislative history concerning the purpose of the exception. S. REP. No. 2140, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1935):

Your committee believes that the orderly and prompt determination and collection of
Federal taxes should not be interfered with by a procedure designed to facilitate the
settlement of private controversies, and that existing procedures both in the Board of
Tax Appeals and the courts afford ample remedies for the correction of tax errors.
The statement of Managers on the Part of the House, H.R. REp. No. 1885, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1935) notes: "The amendment [of the Senate] also adds a section making
it clear that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14, 1934, has no applicability
to federal taxes.
274 10 F.

Supp. 483 (W.D.Ky. 1935), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 84 F.2d 1001 (6th
Cir. 1936).
275 10 F. Supp. at 486-87.

See, e.g., Henrietta Mills v. Hoey, 12 F. Supp. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd mem., 80 F.2d
1011 (2d Cir. 1936); Meridian Grain and Elevator Co. v. Fly, 12 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Miss.

270

1935); William B. Scaife & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 18 F. Supp. 748 (W.D.Pa. 1937), affd,
94 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 603 (1939).
27

1 See Mitchell v. Riddell, 402 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
394 U.S. 456 (1969); Carmichael v. United States, 245 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957).
2 8
7 See Singleton v. Mathis, 284 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1960); In Re Wingreen Co., 412 F.2d
1048 (5th Cir. 1969); Philipp v. United States, 38 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 76-5376 (W.D.
Wash. May 24, 1976).
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0
involving taxes."" A recent case adopting this view was Teutsch v. Ford,""
in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that the IRS could not permit
Dow Chemical Company to deduct certain advertising expenses."' The
court held that the "plaintiff is barred by the express provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act... from obtaining a declaratory judgment with respect
to any provision of the Internal Revenue Act."28

In support of this holding the court cited Jules Hairstylists v
United States, 282 a case supporting the opposing point of view, that the
Declaratory Judgment exception is coterminous with the Anti-Injunction
Act, in that declaratory judgments are prohibited only with respect to assessment and collection. Whether the court in Jules Hairstylists intended that
declaratory judgments would be permissible wherever actions for injunction
are maintainable is unclear. Nevertheless, that view has recently been espoused in many district court decisions. 84
If injunctive relief is permitted under limited circumstances it makes little
sense to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff, especially when the declaratory judgment remedy may be preferable since it involves less coercion of government officials. 212 The declaratory judgment remedy should not permit a
plaintiff to litigate prematurely his tax liability or that of other taxpayers.
Where a plaintiff is aggrieved by IRS action and has no other judicial remedy
available, the weight of recent authority appears to permit actions for declaratory judgment if such action does not threaten to diminish federal
revenues.

279

See 245 F.2d 676; 284 F.2d 616; 402 F.2d 842; 38 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 76-5376.

280 39 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-510 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 1976).
282 I.R.C. § 162.

39 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 77-511.
268 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1967), affd mem., 389 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 934 (1968).
284
See 338 F. Supp. 448; 376 F. Supp. 889; 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5558. Dietrich v.
Alexander, 427 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Chapman v. Alexander, 421 F. Supp. 930
(W.D. La.), affd mem., 552 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1977).
288
See 40 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 2d at 77-6161.
282
283
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CONCLUSION

It is clear from an analysis of recent decisions that several federal
courts have been unwilling to accept the proposition that the Anti-Injunction
Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act exception insulate the IRS from
judicial scrutiny even when judicial intervention would pose no threat to
federal revenues. An analysis of the history of the Anti-Injunction Act indicates that no such insulation was ever intended by Congress.
This does not mean, however, that the business of maintaining nontaxpayer suits is now a simple matter for it is fraught with peril. The redressability component of the injury-in-fact required for standing is always
a formidable obstacle when a plaintiff alleges that harm at the hands of a
third party was caused by illegal government action. When the IRS is involved, the alleged harm must almost always be inflicted indirectly if the
plaintiff is to be able to maintain a successful action for injunctive relief.
Although the decisions in Tax Analysts and Advocates and ASTA are inconsistent with each other and with most precedent in the area of standing,
they signal the difficulty nontaxpayer suits face from courts eager to extend
the decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights.
Nevertheless, the APA has accorded nearly across the board reviewability of agency actions that aggrieve individuals or entities. There is no
basis for excluding IRS rulings from the scope of this act. Gradually, the
lower federal courts, while deferring to the policy of the Anti-Injunction
Act when appropriate, have properly permitted review of such IRS action.
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